Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed by MacAlister, James Kevin & Scanlan, Alfred L., Jr.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 3 Spring 1985 Article 4
1985
Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The
Experiment Has Failed
James Kevin MacAlister
University of Baltimore School of Law
Alfred L. Scanlan Jr.
Jackson & Campbell, P.C.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
MacAlister, James Kevin and Scanlan, Alfred L. Jr. (1985) "Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed,"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 14: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol14/iss3/4
HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION IN MARYLAND: THE 
EXPERIMENT HAS FAILED 
James Kevin MacAlistert 
Alfred L. Scanlan, Jr.t 
The authors note that Maryland's system for health claims arbitra-
tion has failed to reduce the number of malpractice suits, the size of dam-
ages awards, or the delay in resolving these claims. After reviewing the 
current system, its strengths and weaknesses, and various proposals to rem-
edy its problems by amending the current legislation, the authors advance 
their own suggestions for amending Maryland's health claims arbitration 
legislation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With only the most laudable objectives in mind, the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly passed the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act in 
1976.1 The legislators adopted the Act to remedy a perceived crisis in 
the way that malpractice cases were being handled at common law. The 
major symptoms of this crisis were an unparalleled rise in the number of 
suits against health care providers and skyrocketing medical malpractice 
verdicts. As a cure, the legislature required most malpractice suits be 
arbitrated before being filed in the state's trial courts. 
Health claims arbitration has failed to live up to its promise. It has 
neither reduced the number of malpractice suits nor reduced the size of 
awards. Rather, recent statistics reveal not only a rise in the number of 
malpractice claims filed, but, overall, arbitration panels have been more 
generous, in awarding damages, than their jury counterparts. Also, by 
requiring arbitration before litigation, the arbitration Act has extended 
the delay all parties must endure between medical injury and final adjudi-
cation. To some, these developments suggest that health claims arbitra-
tion has exacerbated the very problems it was designed to solve, while 
others look upon arbitration as being totally ineffective. 
To understand why the arbitration system has failed, the reasons for 
its enactment must be understood. Hence, this article opens with an ex-
ploration of the unique concerns and interests that distinguish medical 
malpractice from other areas of the law. Mindful of these concerns, the 
so-called "medical malpractice crisis" of the early 1970's is examined in 
terms of its causes. The next section includes an explanation of the arbi-
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1. Health Claims Arbitration Act, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 495. 
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tration statute and an analysis of where and why it has failed to meet its 
objectives. The bulk of the analysis is devoted to an appraisal of the 
many solutions that have been proposed to solve the problems with the 
current approach to arbitration. The goal of this analysis is to demon-
strate that a health claims arbitration system can work if it is engineered 
with an understanding of its limitations. This understanding of the limi-
tations of the arbitration system also serves as a framework for a compre-
hensive amendment to the Act. 
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IS IT REALLY SO 
DIFFERENT? 
Like so many areas of the law, medical malpractice litigation has 
become quite specialized. To those who do not practice it, and to attor-
neys who only dabble in it, the law of medical malpractice is perceived as 
arcane, fraught with needless complexity and with unjustifiable expenses. 
These complaints, however, are merely an acknowledgment of the 
problems and interests unique to malpractice cases. It is these problems 
and interests that cause much of the expense and delay experienced by 
parties involved in a malpractice suit. 
A. Complexity 
In truth, the substance of medical negligence law is no more compli-
cated than that of general negligence law. To make a case against a 
health care provider, a patient who has been wronged need only prove 
duty, breach of duty, injury, and a causal nexus between the breach and 
the injury.2 Unlike ordinary negligence actions, however, medical mal-
practice involves the conduct of a professional. As a professional, the 
defendant physician can be held liable only if he fails to conform his 
conduct to the accepted professional standard of care.3 In other words, 
"a physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is 
expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to 
which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances."4 On its 
face, this is a fairly simple proposition. Certainly, it is no more compli-
cated than the cryptic "risk/utility" test applied in products liability 
suits.s 
2. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 484-85, 187 A.2d 671, 673 
(1963); Hahn v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 695, 461 A.2d 7, 13 
(1983). 
3. See generally Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 199,202, 
349 A.2d 245, 253, 254 (1975) (articulating the rules for physicians and hospitals). 
The application of a professional standard to physicians is a time worn proposition 
in Maryland. See Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 380-81, 35 A. 1094, 1096 (1896); 
State ex rei. Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 172, 16 A. 382, 384 (1889). 
4. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,200,349 A.2d 245,253 
(1975). 
5. This test is used in cases involving design defects. Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 
80,375 A.2d 1122 (1977); Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226,437 
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What complicates medical malpractice cases is the subject matter.6 
Medicine is a complicated science. Arbitration panels and lay juries are 
often called upon to answer questions such as how long a patient has had 
adenocarcinoma of the left breast; whether a patient has a severe 
characterological disorder or a biological depression; and whether inju-
ries are attributable to the interaction of Takayashu's disease with 
hypertension. 
It is not difficult to understand why lay Jurors mIght have a prooJem 
resolving these issues. In recognition of this difficulty, the Maryland ju-
diciary has steadfastly required that expert testimony be used to explain 
the standard of medical competence to which the defendant physician 
should be held, and to show any deviation from that standard.1 In con-
trast, when both of these issues are so clear that the lay person can un-
derstand the case without assistance, expert testimony is not required. 8 
Establishing the standard of care is not always simple because it var-
ies according to "advances in the profession, availability of facilities, spe-
cialization or general practice, proximity of specialists and special 
facilities."9 As a result, the experts for both sides must familiarize them-
selves with these variables because what would be negligent for a physi-
cian practicing in one locality might not be negligent for a different 
physician in a different locality. 
Once the appropriate standard has been established, the plaintiff 
must show that it has not been met. lO The very nature of the medical 
profession makes this a difficult task. Medicine is a practice that requires 
A.2d 242 (1981). See generally Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 
A.2d 955 (1976) (landmark case adopting strict liability in Maryland). 
6. The framers of the Health Claims Arbitration Act cited these complexities as rea-
sons for modifying the common law approach to malpractice cases. See MARY-
LAND STATE BAR AsS'N, REpORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER 
PROBLEMS RELATED TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MARYLAND 2 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as SPECIAL COMMITTEE]' 
7. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 622-23, 258 A.2d 595, 599 
(1969); Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 361, 171 A. 49, 52 (1934); Dunham v. Elder, 18 
Md. App. 360, 363-64, 306 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1973). Expert testimony also pre-
vents jurors from speculating about matters which they do not understand. 3 C. 
KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 29.01, at 29 (1983). 
8. The two recognized exceptions are: (1) informed consent, Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 
432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); and (2) instances when the deviation from the standard 
of care is so clear that a layman could understand it was negligent, Thomas v. 
Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972) (doctor negligently failed to attend to a 
patient who needed emergency treatment); Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Hadary, 22 
Md. App. 186,322 A.2d 258 (1974) (use of non-sterile needle); Holloway v. Hauver, 
22 Md. App. 303, 322 A.2d 890 (patient swabbed with alcohol shortly before a 
spark-causing machine ignited the alcohol), cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). 
9. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 200-01, 349 A.2d 245, 
253 (1975). There are also differences among specialists who subscribe to different 
schools of thought. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 187 (W. Kee-
ton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON]. 
10. In meeting this burden, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption of due care 
that operates in favor of the physician. See Riffey v. Tonder, 36 Md. App. 633, 647-
51,375 A.2d 1138, 1146-47 (1977). Additionally, liability can never be predicated 
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constant vigilance and technical skill, coupled with tremendous intuition 
and judgment. It is not practiced by the infallible Marcus Welby or by 
an arithmetically precise computer. Rather, it is practiced by ordinary, 
dedicated, intelligent, and well-meaning human beings who sometimes 
err. I I The chore of reconstructing the judgment call or mistake that in-
jured the patient is seldom easy .. 
Errors in medical judgment are as difficult to identify as they are to 
prove. To say that the area of medical judgment is a gray area is to slight 
it by understatement. Start with the proposition that the cases involve a 
human body, an organism so complicated that modem medicine has only 
begun scratching the surface of many of its intricacies. Then continue 
with the idea that, while the tools for evaluating defects in the human 
body have become sophisticated and widely available, they are not infalli-
ble. Moreover, these tools are only as reliable as the human being who 
translates the data produced by them into a diagnosis. 
Actually proving medical errors in court is an equally complicated 
proposition. Because the plaintiff has the burden of going forward, he 
must show exactly how the errant physician deviated from the standard 
of care. 12 Thus, the trial of a malpractice case usually involves recreating 
the symptoms, the tests, and the recommended courses of treatment for a 
particular patient. This is usually accomplished through the use of ex-
pert testimony. The plaintiff's expert must testify that, under the circum-
stances, a competent physician would have pursued another course of 
treatment. 
It is this question of circumstances that often becomes the focal 
point of the heated malpractice battles. Understandably, the plaintiff will 
attempt to recreate, from a plaintiffs perspective, the circumstances that 
confronted the doctor. His expert testimony will explain that, under 
these circumstances, the health care provider could have done better. 
The defendant physician, in contrast, will attempt to portray the plain-
solely upon a bad result. Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 395, 293 A.2d 253, 255 
(1972); Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 462-63, 138 A.2d 902, 905 (1958). 
11. The infrequency of these errors is borne out when it is noted that of all health care 
providers who are sued for malpractice, only one percent have been sued more than 
twice before. REpORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE PROVID-
ERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE app. EE, FF (1984) [hereinafter cited 
as LIEBMANN REPORT]. It should be noted, however, that certain high-risk special-
ists are sued considerably more frequently. [d. at 7. 
12. See Stevens v. Union Memorial Hosp., 47 Md. App. 627, 424 A.2d 1118 (1981) 
(insufficient evidence introduced to show negligence because it was possible that 
other persons present in the operating room might have caused the injury); Hans v. 
Franklin Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 329, 338, 347 A.2d 905, 911 (1975) (man who 
emerged from a hemorrhoidectomy with a clawed hand failed to reconstruct the 
physician'S negligent act because "[t]he necessary antiseptic exclusiveness of the op-
erating room thwarted appellant's every attempt to find the cause of his injury"); see 
also State ex rei. Baltimore Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 177 Md. 517, 527, 10 A.2d 
612,617 (1940) (there "must be something more than a showing that the evidence 
might be consistent with the plaintiffs' theory" even though the true plaintiff, the 
only eyewitness for the appellants, died during surgery). 
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tiffs case as an unfair attempt to second guess a legitimate medical deci-
sion, a medical decision that was made under real life conditions, without 
the luxury of a dispassionate, leisurely armchair review of all of the avail-
able medical information. In other words, the defendant's position will 
be that he acted as reasonably as he could have under the 
circumstances. 13 
Lastly, the plaintiff must show that the physician's negligence proxi-
mately caused the patient's injuries. 14 This issue also implicates many of 
the complexities of modem medicine because the patient's condition may 
be attributable to nothing more than a gap in medical technology that 
would have yielded a bad result even if the doctor had acted compe-
tently.IS Also, the defendant physician may raise the issue of contribu-
tory negligence by arguing that the plaintiff is at least partially 
responsible for his injury.16 Because these issues are often no less com-
plex than those of duty and breach of duty, proving causation frequently 
requires expert testimony.17 
B. Expenses 
As the previous section illustrates, the factual complexities and bur-
dens of proof make expert testimony a necessity in most malpractice 
cases. Additionally, counsel for both sides generally consult experts 
throughout the trial preparation period to assist them in understanding 
the medical issues. This makes preparing and litigating medical malprac-
13. There are a number of legal doctrines that attempt to recognize these real world 
conditions. Most importantly, the law does not treat a physician as a warrantor of 
the treatment he prescribes. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 9, at 186. Rather, 
the law predicates liability on the health care provider's failure to possess the appro-
priate level of skill and training. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Thus, 
the mere fact of an unsuccessful result is not evidence of negligence. See supra note 
10 and accompanying text. Moreover, in recent years, Maryland's highest court has 
attempted to adjust the standard of care to account for the variables among practi-
tioners of given specialties and the different facilities available to different doctors. 
See generally supra text accompanying note 9 (different factors considered). 
14. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); State ex rei. Baltimore 
Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 177 Md. 517, 10 A.2d 612 (1940). 
15. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 485-86, 187 A.2d 671, 673 
(1963) (the injury may be "due only to the fact, unfortunate as it may be, that even 
in this day of modern medicine, many operations by qualified surgeons do not cor-
rect the condition treated due to the fault of nothing more than the nature of the 
injury"); see also D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1119.02 
(1983) (examining the "calculated risk" built into every medical treatment). 
16. Moodie v. Santoni, 292 Md. 582,441 A.2d 323 (1982); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 
60, 148 A. 124 (1930). 
17. 3 C. KRAMER, supra note 7, 1129.01(2); 5A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION, DEFENSES, 
DAMAGES § 1.01(1)(b)(i) (L. Frumer & M. Friedman ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
PERSONAL INJURY]. Indeed, proving causation may require expert testimony when 
it would not have been necessary to use such testimony to prove the standard of care 
and its breach. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 448, 379 A.2d 1014, 1024 (1977); 
see also supra note 8 (cases that have articulated the exception to the expert testi-
mony requirement). 
486 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
tice cases an expensive proposition. Experts often charge from $100 to 
$300 per hour; it is not unusual in a hotly contested and complicated 
malpractice case for each party to spend over $10,000 in experts' fees. 
In addition to expert witness fees, the magnitude and complexity of 
malpractice litigation mean that countless hours of attorney time are in-
vested in each case. Although plaintiffs' attorneys ordinarily hope to re-
ceive compensation for this time by taking a contingency fee, defendants 
and their insurers usually compensate counsel on an hourly basis. IS It is 
not unusual for legal defense-related fees to exceed 22% of the total dis-
bursements of a malpractice insurer. 19 
C The Stakes 
The competing interests involved make medical malpractice suits 
worth pursuing and defending. The health care provider has both per-
sonal and financial interests at stake. He stands before the trier of fact 
charged with having injured one of his patients. This alone can be psy-
chologically wearing upon a physician. Also, he faces a verdict that may 
tarnish his professional reputation, and, in a case where the allegations of 
malpractice are serious enough, there is always the possibility that the 
jury's verdict will exceed the limits of the doctor's malpractice policy. 
Thus, not only does the defendant face a potential loss of standing in the 
professional community, but he faces the prospect of incurring a substan-
tial personal financial loss as well. 
Second, the patient has been victimized. Medical injuries caused by 
negligence can be devastating. The file drawers of attorneys who litigate 
medical malpractice cases are filled with countless tragedies. Surgical 
accidents, complications of childbirth, and diagnostic inattention can 
lead to mutilation, paralysis, scarring, mental dysfunctions, and death. 
Understandably, when negligence is found to have caused one of these 
tragedies, arbitration panels and juries are not reluctant to award sub-
stantial sums of money to the victims.20 Patients have another interest: 
the need for swift access to justice. Faced with medical bills and crip-
pling disabilities, patients and their creditors cannot wait several years 
for compensation. Delayed justice swiftly becomes denied justice. 
The interests of attorneys on both sides cannot be ignored. As do all 
attorneys, they hope to receive compensation for the large amount of 
time that must be committed to preparing and trying a malpractice case. 
While some may argue that it is unethical to consider this interest, it is 
18. The defendant's interest in containing the cost of defense, namely counsel fees, was 
recognized in the committee report that gave rise to the Maryland statute. MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF 1976 11 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as 1976 REPORT]. 
19. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 15. 
20. 2 MARYLAND HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION DECISIONS AND MATERIALS (1984) 
(see "Index by Recovery Amount" which appears after the tab marked "Index") 
[hereinafter cited as DECISIONS & MATERIALS]. 
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not unethical for an attorney to take a case because he anticipates com-
pensation. Quite the opposite is true: only a foolish lawyer accepts a 
case without worrying about how he will be paid. Under the contingency 
fee arrangements frequently negotiated between plaintiffs counsel and 
client, the attorney hopes to receive a fee that constitutes a percentage of 
a verdict that could exceed a million dollars.21 This incentive makes it 
well worth the cost of bringing malpractice suits. Defense attorneys, by 
contrast, are compensated on an hourly basis for the time they invest in a 
case. The ~'ost of defense, therefore, is an interest that the defendant, and 
more importantly the defendant's insurer, cannot ignore. 
Last, there are the concerns of the doctor's insurance carrier. The 
carrier's interests are usually consonant with the insured's interests, but 
may sometimes conflict. First, there is always the possibility that the 
verdict will exceed the policy's limit. Second, in a questionable case of 
negligence, the insurer may opt to settle a case rather than risk the high 
cost of defending a protracted suit.22 The physician, in contrast, may 
want his conduct vindicated in a public trial. Additionally, some doctors 
are concerned that a settlement will be used by the carrier to justify a 
future rate increase.23 
III. THE ADVENT OF HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION 
Maryland has had mandatory arbitration of medical malpractice 
claims since 1976.24 The policy and history behind the General Assem-
bly's decision to adopt this arbitration system are well documented.2s 
Primarily, arbitration was enacted to halt what was viewed at the time as 
21. 1976 REpORT, supra note 18, at 11; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Eouc. & WELFARE, 
PUB. No. 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 32-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW]. In 
recognition of this incentive, some jurisdictions have attempted to regulate contin-
gency fees. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 23 (1983) (discussing authorities on 
the SUbject). . 
22. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. It should be noted, however, that an 
insurance company owes a duty to consider the insured's interest before settling a 
case. D. LoUiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 15,1120.06. 
23. Comments of the Medical Practice Action Committee 3-4 (1976) (available in 
Maryland Legislative Reference File HB986); Letter from Marshall A. Diamond, 
M.D., to Senator Larry Wiser (February 23, 1976) (available in Maryland Legisla-
tive Reference File HB986C). 
24. It was not until 1978 that the volume of cases began to rise. This initial delay was 
attributed to a constitutional challenge to the Health Claims Arbitration Act. 
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the constitutionality of the Act, 
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 
805 (1978), the volume of claims filed increased considerably. See LIEBMANN RE-
PORT, supra note II, at 14-15, app. F. 
25. Some of this policy is alluded to in Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 280-81, 
385 A.2d 57, 61, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). Also, the Legislative Refer-
ence Service of the Maryland General Assembly has compiled files which contain 
the written testimony of those who commented upon each of the proposed bills. 
The Service is located in the basement of the Legislative Resources Building, An-
napolis, Maryland. 
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a malpractice "crisis. "26 This crisis began in the early 1970's with a dra-
matic increase in the number of malpractice suits being filed and an 
alarming rise in the dollar amounts of malpractice verdicts.27 The com-
bined operation of these factors had a significant effect on the health care 
practitioners and the companies that insured them. 
The causes of this upsurge in litigation were in many respects as 
complicated as the social problems that existed at the time. Among the 
contributing factors, for example, was the erosion of the traditional doc-
tor-patient bond.28 Rather than consulting the trusted family physician, 
patients were turning increasingly to impersonal medical centers. In-
stead of a patient seeing a general practitioner for all ills, patients were 
consulting specialists and consultants in increasing numbers.29 These de-
velopments combined to erode the bond of trust and friendship that had 
existed between doctor and patient. As a result, apprehension about su-
ing the family doctor disappeared and the reverence jurors once pos-
sessed for physicians vanished. 30 Finally, it appeared that society as a 
whole was becoming more litigious.31 The rush to sue doctors was and 
is, in part, an outgrowth of this trend. 
Certain changes in the law spurred this rush to the courts by making 
it easier to prove malpractice.32 For example, in Maryland there has 
been an abandonment of the strict locality rule. 33 Before this change 
took place, a patient could only use the testimony of an expert drawn 
26. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16; Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489 (1977); Ursic, Maryland Health Claims Arbitration 
System, 12 U. BALT. L.F. 14 (1982); see also McGuirk & Rafferty, Medical Mal-
practice and the Maryland Legislature, 6 U. MD. L.F. 9-10 (1976) (the General 
Assembly acted in a "crisis atmosphere"). 
27. Abraham, supra note 26, at 490. 
28. Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE 
L.J. 1179, 1183; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation - A First 
Checkup, 50 TuL. L. REv. 655, 657 (1976). 
29. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to the 
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 74, 76 (1980); Note, Medical Mal-
practice Arbitration: A Patient's Perspective, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 123, 127-28 (1983). 
According to the LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, 49% of the claimants who 
filed arbitration claims reported no prior patient relationship between themselves 
and the defendant physician. ld. at app. M; Comment, supra note 28, at 657-58. 
30. 3 C. KRAMER, supra note 7, at viii. 
31. See generally J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (examining the in-
creasing propensity to resort to litigation and its effect on society in general). 
32. Many of these developments are reviewed in HEW, supra note 21, at 27-31, and 
Abraham, supra note 26, at 495-512. 
33. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 199-201,349 A.2d 245, 
252-53 (1975) (subject of expert's testimony); Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 274 
Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975) (location from which the expert must be drawn). For 
a discussion of the competing policies behind the controversial rule, compare Ellin, 
The Laws of Medical Malpractice in Maryland, 3 U. BALT. L. REv. 207 (1974) 
(anti-locality rule) with King & Coe, The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 221 (1974) (pro locality rule). 
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from the same locality as the defendant physician.34 Understandably, in 
close-knit medical communities, physicians were often reluctant to testify 
against their colleagues.3s As a result, many patients' claims were lost 
for want of expert testimony. 36 
After the abrogation of the strict locality rule, any expert could be 
called to testify if he was familiar with the standard of care in the defend-
ant physician's medical neighborhood. This neighborhood is deemed to 
consist of the facilities available to most of the competent physicians in 
the general vicinity.37 The result of the abrogation of the strict locality 
rule was that the state's courts were thrown open to out-of-state experts 
who had no ties to local physicians. And, experts who make a living by 
testifying in malpractice cases could be imported by plaintiffs to pierce 
any local conspiracy of silence that once might have existed. 
These social and legal developments, along with the resulting rise in 
the number of malpractice suits, had identifiable negative effects on the 
practice of medicine and malpractice insurers. Physicians began to prac-
tice defensive medicine by prescribing unnecessary batteries of tests to 
protect themselves against a charge that they somehow missed an ob-
scure illness.38 Also, the more apprehensive members of the profession 
grew reluctant either to undertake high risk operations or to specialize in 
high risk areas of medicine.39 
The medical malpractice insurance carriers also reacted to the in-
creased cost of defending this avalanche of malpractice suits. Initially, 
they responded by implementing dramatic increases in malpractice insur-
ance premium rates. These increases were so expensive that the members 
of the medical community who had to pay the premiums gained the sym-
pathy of the media and the public at large.40 When rate increases did not 
solve the problem, the insurance carriers began to withdraw their medi-
cal malpractice coverage from the state.41 
34. State ex rei. Soloman v. Fishell, 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962); Dunham v. 
Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973). 
35. This has been referred to as a "conspiracy of silence." Shilkret v. Annapolis Emer-
gency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 194, 349 A.2d 245, 249 (1975) (citing Note, 40 
FORDHAM L. REv. 435, 438 (1971». 
36. See Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 22 Md. App. 196, 322 A.2d 548 (1974), rev'd, 
274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975); Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 367, 306 
A.2d 568, 572 (1973). . 
37. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,200,349 A.2d 245, 253 
(1975). 
38. HEW, supra note 21, at 14, app. at 38; Quinn, supra note 29, at 75. A recent study 
by the American Medical Association estimated that $5.1 billion has been spent by 
doctors on defensive medicine. See Middleton, The Medical Malpractice War, 
NAT'L L. J. 1 (Aug. 27, 1984). 
39. See supra note 38. The problem with light risk specialties is discussed in LIEBMANN 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8. 
40. See Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is it Cost Effective, 36 MD. 
L. REV. 533, 533 (1977); Quinn, supra note 29, at 75. 
41. Quinn, supra note 29, at 77. For a discussion of the reasons for this withdrawal, see 
McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 26, at 10-11. See also Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
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Faced with the prospect of having largely uninsured medical practi-
tioners, the Maryland General Assembly acted swiftly. First, the Medi-
cal Mutual Liability Insurance Company, a physician-owned, state-
sponsored insurance carrier, was set up to cope with the loss of the pri-
vate sector insurance carriers.42 Second, the health claims arbitration 
network was fashioned in an effort to attack the root causes of the crisis 
that had driven the insurers out of the state. This arbitration system has 
remained relatively unchanged since its inception.43 
IV. THE PROCEDURES OF ARBITRATION 
Procedurally, the operation of the health claims arbitration system 
is not difficult to understand. The Act requires that "[a]ll claims, suits, 
and actions, including cross-claims, [and] third-party claims ... by a 
person against a health care provider for medical injury allegedly suffered 
by the person in which damages of more than $5,000 are sought are sub-
ject to and shall be governed by the provisions" of the Health Claims 
Arbitration Act.44 
In practice, this means that all traditional medical malpractice suits 
against health care providers "may not be brought or pursued in any 
court of this state except in accordance with" the Arbitration Act.45 The 
cases are heard by a three-member panel consisting of an attorney, a 
health care provider, and a member of the general public.46 The attor-
ney, whQ always serves as the chairperson,47 is regarded as the guardian 
of the rule of law; the physician is believed to supply the expertise re-
quired to understand the medical complexities; and the layperson is to 
supply conscience and commonsense, in contrast to his professional 
counterparts.48 A number of complicated problems have arisen out of 
this deceptively simple system. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Because a plaintiff is required to seek his initial remedy through 
Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 339 A.2d 291 (1975) (concerning with-
drawal of the dominant carrier). 
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 548-556 (1979). 
43. There are, however, a number of regulations and informal rulings that have been 
issued by the Office of the Director of Health Claims Arbitration. These regulations 
are comprehensively reproduced in DECISIONS & MATERIALS, supra note 20. 
44. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(a) (1984). For a discussion of the 
Act, see McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 26, at 10. 
45. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02 (1984). The sole statutory exemption from arbi-
tration is for actions "in which damages of $5,000 or less are sought." [d. 
46. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-03(c) (1984). The lay panel member must be se-
lected from the "general public who are neither attorneys, health care providers, or 
agents or employees of an insurance company or society." [d. The parties may, 
within the time for returning their lists to the Director, agree in writing to have a 
single arbitrator replace the panel. [d. § 3-2A-04(e). 
47. [d. § 3-2A-05(c). 
48. Abraham, supra note 26, at 514. 
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arbitration, a circuit court cannot hear a malpractice claim until it has 
been "submitted" to arbitration.49 Thus, before a case can be filed, the 
patient's attorney must decide whether his client's cause of action is arbi-
trable. Because not all claims are subject to arbitration, filing in the 
wrong forum can lead to a dismissal of the suit, so often after limitations 
have run. 
lt is undisputed that the stereotypical negligence-based malpractice 
claim falls squarely within the ambit of the Act. But these claims only 
encompass some of the potential torts that a health care provider may 
have committed;51 The Act does not limit itself to these actions, but 
embraces any "injury arising or resUlting from the rendering or failure to 
render health care."52 Thus, companion claims pleaded under the liberal 
joinder rules are also subject to arbitration. 
A more difficult question arises when the plaintiff has not based his 
case against a health care provider on a traditional malpractice theory. 
Instead, he may have chosen to allege only ordinary, nonmedical negli-
gence,53 breach of warranty,54 or various intentional tortS.55 In a series 
of decisions, Maryland's appellate courts have begun the task of sorting 
out the arbitrability of these nonmalpractice, medically-based claims. 56 
The one hard and fast rule emerging from these cases is that the 
inclusion of a negligence count in a complaint will render the entire case 
subject to arbitration. 57 The sole exception to this rule recognized thus 
far arises when the claim against a health care provider is "for damages 
arising from a professional's failure to exercise due care in such non-
professional situations such as premises liability, slander, assault, etc."58 
The mere fact that the defendant is a health care provider and the plain-
tiff is a patient, absent a breach of the professional standard of care, S9 will 
not subject the plaintiff's claim to arbitration. 
Certain intentional torts and contract claims of a "professional na-
ture" are also covered by the Act. Although the courts have yet to artic-
ulate a basis for distinguishing arbitrable intentional torts from their non-
49. Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38,485 A.2d 265 (1984). The failure to arbitrate does not 
mean that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction; rather, it indicates that a condition 
precedent has not been fulfilled. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91, 447 
A.2d 860, 864-65 (1982). 
50. Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 324, 452 A.2d 1302, 1305 (1982). 
51. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
52. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-Ol(f) (1984). 
53. See Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 459 A.2d 196 (1983). 
54. See Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md. 171,476 A.2d 1167 (1984). 
55. See Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 460 A.2d 57 (1983). 
56. See infra notes 57-62. Additionally, the courts have interpreted the effective date of 
the mandatory arbitration requirement. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,447 
A.2d 860 (1982); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325,428 A.2d 80 (1981). 
57. Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 158-59,460 A.2d 57, 60 (1983); Cannon v. McKen, 
296 Md. 27, 38 n.4, 459 A.2d 196, 202 n.4 (1983). 
58. Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 36-37,459 A.2d 196, 202 (1983). 
59.Id. 
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arbitrable counterparts, Maryland's highest court has stated that assault 
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not arbi-
trable because they are premised upon an "intentional, malicious, wanton 
and reckless act."60 In contrast, a suit based solely upon a physician's 
breach of an express contractural warranty can be arbitrable if "the claim 
is based on the rendering or failure to render health care."61 For exam-
ple, when the warranty is the type of promise that "[o]nly a physician in 
his professional capacity could make," the claim must be submitted to 
arbitration. 62 
B. Third Party Practice 
Just as the Act sweeps companion claims within its reach, it uses the 
rules pertaining to joinder of parties to accomplish a similar result. 
Under the Act, "[a]li ... third party claims ... are subject to and shall 
be governed by the arbitration statute. "63 Thus, a health care provider 
cannot be joined under a malpractice theory as a third party in a nonmal-
practice case in the circuit court.64 Rather, a separate proceeding must 
be commenced with the health claims arbitration office. 
It is not clear whether this language sweeps third party claims 
against nonhealth care providers within the jurisdiction of the health 
claims network. A recent court of special appeals decision suggests that 
nonhealth care providers, such as drug manufacturers, are not a proper 
party in a health claims proceeding.6s There is, however, some precedent 
to the contrary, allowing these third party complaints to be litigated 
before a health claims panel. 66 
Even if a nonhealth care provider is not a proper party in health 
claims proceedings, the court of appeals has recognized that a direct 
claim against a nonhealth care provider based on the derivative liability 
of a health care provider must be arbitrated.67 In Group Health Associa-
60. Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 161, 460 A.2d 57,61 (1983). The court, however, 
limited the potential reach of its decision. In a footnote, it stated: "[w]e do not 
mean hereby to indicate that all intentional torts of a professional nature are not 
covered by the Act as there may well be many such acts that would be so covered." 
Id. at 161 n.5, 460 A.2d at 61 n.5. See generally PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 17, 
at 1.02 (delineating battery in the context of a malpractice claim). 
61. Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md. 171, 175, 476 A.2d 1167, 1169 (1984). 
62. Id. at 176, 476 A.2d at 1170. 
63. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(a) (1984). 
64. Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198, 1205 (1983). 
65. See Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., No. 85-1254, slip op. at 9-10 (Md. 
App. June 6, 1985) (court accepted, without question, the parties' stipulation that 
this was the correct rule). 
66. Lee v. Halikman, No. 84-21501O/CL23635 (Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Oct. 
22, 1984) (ruling that the third party defendant product manufacturer would have 
to be included in a health claims proceeding before the arbitration step could be 
considered completed); Wade v. Steinberg, HCA No. 83-18 (health claim panel 
chairman refused to dismiss a third party complaint against a drug manufacturer). 
67. Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 112,453 A.2d 1198, 1203 (1983). 
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tion v. Blumenthal,68 for example, the court reasoned that the patient's 
respondeat superior claim against a nonhealth care provider was arbitra-
ble because "the aggregate of operative facts is still the alleged malprac-
tice of the health care provider."69 In essence, the derivative liability 
being litigated was nothing more than a patient's claim that a health care 
provider had committed malpractice. 
C The Arbitration Hearing 
Actions before the health claims arbitration panels are commenced 
by the filing of a claim with the Director of the arbitration office.70 The 
Director, in tum, is responsible for serving a copy of the complaint on 
the health care provider.71 The issue is joined by the defendant's filing of 
a responsive pleading. 72 
Once the claim has been filed and answered, the panel selection pro-
cess begins. This process is initiated when the Health Claims Arbitration 
Office selects panel candidates from rosters kept by the Director's Of-
fice. 73 Candidates are selected randomly from the rosters.74 The only 
exception to this random selection process is that an effort is made to 
include physicians who specialize in the same area of expertise as that 
practiced by the defendant health care provider.7s Three separate lists of 
five candidates are prepared: attorneys, health care providers, and 
68.Id. 
69. Id. at 112, 453 A.2d at 1203. 
70. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a) (1984); MD. ADMIN. CoDE tit. I, 
§ .03.01.03 (1984) [hereinafter cited as COMAR]. For a detailed study of the work-
ing of the Director's Office, see DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND FISCAL PLANNING, 
DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND AcnvmES, MANAGEMENT ANALY-
SIS STUDY OF THE HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION OFFICE AND SELECTED As-
PECTS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 16-34 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY]. 
71. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a) (1984). The Director accomplishes this by 
obtaining service by the local sheriff's office. COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.05. 
72. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a) (1984); see also COMAR, supra note 66, 
§ .03.01.06. The answer must be filed "within the time provided in the Maryland 
Rules for filing a responsive pleading to a declaration." MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 3-2A-04(a) (1984) (incorporating MD. R.P. 2-321). 
73. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-03 (1984); CO MAR, supra note 66, 
§ .03.01.04(A)(2) ("[t]he register shall be divided into the following three categories: 
(a) Members of the general public who are not attorneys, health care providers, or 
agents or employees of any insurance company or society, (b) Attorneys, (c) Health 
care providers, subdivided, if practicable, by recognized health care specialties"); see 
also id. § .03.01.07(A)(3) ("[i]f feasible, each category of the register also shall be 
divided into geographic areas based on the county in which the candidates reside"). 
74. COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.07(B)(1) ("[t]he director may prepare the list of 
panel candidates from each category so that it consists only of individuals residing 
in counties in which a court would have venue"). 
75. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-03(b) (1984); The Director need only include such 
specialists when the defendant's response "states that the matter falls within one or 
more recognized specialties," and then only "if practicable." MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (1984). COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.07(C). 
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laypersons.76 These lists, containing the names and biographical data on 
each proposed panelist,77 are then delivered to the parties. 
Each side is allowed two peremptory strikes from the list. 78 Strikes 
are usually made in writing.79 Additionally, strikes must be made within 
thirty days from the time the panel lists are dispatched.80 It is not unu-
sual for one of the attorneys involved to miss the deadline.81 When this 
oversight occurs, the forgetful attorney's client is at the mercy of the 
other side's strikes. 
Parties may also object to any or all proposed panel members for 
cause.82 The Director can sustain the objection and remove the panel 
member, if he finds "a reasonable basis for the objection."83 
Once a panel is selected, the proceedings are run by the panel chair-
man,84 who is always the attorney.85 He rules on preliminary motions, 
sets schedules, conducts conferences, and otherwise acts as hearing of-
ficer and judge.86 These broad powers are conferred upon the chairman, 
regardless of the training or expertise possessed by the individual attor-
ney. The two major powers conferred upon the panel chairman are the 
authority to enter a summary decision and the right to require a prehear-
ing conference. 
A 1985 amendment to the Act empowered panel chairmen to grant 
summary decisions.87 Substantively, a summary decision is analogous to 
a summary judgment. Procedurally, there is a difference in how sum-
76. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (1984). Before dispatching the lists to the 
parties, the Director must contact each proposed panelist to verify that there are no 
conflicts of interest and that the proposed panelist is available to serve. COMAR, 
supra note 66, § .03.01.07(B)(2). If one of these problems is uncovered, the Director 
must add a new name to the list and again check for conflicts and availability. /d. 
§ .03.01.07(B)(3). 
77. MD. Crs. & JUD. hoc. § 3-2A-04(b) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01.07(C). 
78. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(c) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01.07(0)(2). 
79. COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.07(0)(2) (objections to panel members must be in 
writing and state the basis for the objections). The regulation further states that the 
Director "shall make the strikes for a party on failure of the party to return a list 
and for multiple claimants or health care providers on notice that they cannot agree 
on their stikes in a particular category." Id. § .03.01.07(0)(4). 
80. Id. § .03.01.07(0)(2). 
81. One is well advised to photocopy the biographical data and circulate it among one's 
clients, including the insurance company and/or self-insured hospitals, before mak-
ing strikes. Not only do the clients often have valuable insights, or perhaps some 
personal knowledge of a potential panel member, but also they serve as an addi-
tional reminder to make strikes in a timely fashion. 
82. COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.07(0)(2). 
83.Id. 
84. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(c) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01.08(B). 
85. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(c) (1984). 
86. COMAR, supra note 66, §§ .03.01.08(B), .03.01.10(0). 
87. 1985 Md. Laws 1245-46 (to be codified as MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-05(a». 
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mary judgment is handled in the circuit courts and how summary deci-
sions will probably be handled in health claim proceedings. 88 The 
amendment creates this apparent procedural dichotomy by its require-
ment that "all issues of law shall be referred by the director to the panel 
chairman. All issues of fact shall be referred by the director to the arbi-
tration panel."89 
The amendment thus assigns to the Director the duty of distinguish-
ing issues of law from issues of fact. This alters the decisional law, which 
has steadfastly held that the director has no judicial powers.90 In addi-
tion to expanding the Director's authority, the new subsection fails to 
state how and when it can be invoked. It is unclear whether a panel 
chairman may entertain a motion for summary decision for issues of law 
that arise after the Director has referred the case to the panel. 
The amendment may displace decisional law only to the extent that 
it applies to issues of law that are included in the Director's initial refer-
ral to the panel chairman. This interpretation would be consistent with 
the accepted notion that the Director loses all control over a case once he 
has referred it to the panel.91 Following this approach, the common law, 
which requires that a majority of the panel approve summary decisions,92 
would govern the resolution of all issues of law that arise after the refer-
ral by the Director. 
A different interpretation of the amendment, however, is that a mo-
tion for a summary decision may be made any time an issue of law arises, 
but that motion would have to be referred, by the panel chairman, back 
to the Director. The Director would then decide if the issue is indeed 
one of law and not of fact, and then, if it is an issue of law, the Director 
would send it back to the panel chairman for decision. Although some 
may view the need for this referral to the Director as wasteful, under 
cannons of statutory construction, the judiciary is powerless to construe 
a statute without giving effect to all its terms.93 Thus, given the plain, 
unambiguous language of the amendment in calling for referral by the 
Director, it is difficult to conceive of how to avoid a referral back to the 
88. See MD. R.P. 2-501 (procedures governing summary judgments in the circuit 
courts). 
89. 1985 Md. Laws 1245-46 (to be codified as MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-
2A-05(a)(I». 
90. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 285-87, 385 A.2d 57, 64-65, appeal 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 62 Md. 519, 527-28, 
490 A.2d 720, 724 (1985). In addition to the authority to distinguish issues of fact 
from issues of law, the new subsection also empowers the Director to "rule on all 
issues oflaw arising prior to the hearing that are not dispositive of the case." 1985 
Md. Laws 1246 (to be codified as MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-
05(a)(2». Even though this authority is limited to instances "where a panel chair-
man has not been appointed," Id., it clearly vests the Director with judicial power. 
91. See ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 12. 
92. See Stiffer v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19, 24-25, 488 A.2d 192, 194-95 (1985). 
93. See, e.g., Silbert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 153,482 A.2d 483, 489 (1984); City of Balti-
more v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283, 477 A.2d 1174,1177 (1984). 
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director for later arising motions for summary decision, unless such mo-
tions be deemed waived if not made before the initial referral by the 
director. 
To facilitate the operation of the entire process, most panel chair-
men have a prehearing scheduling confererice,94 at which deadlines are 
set for the closing of discovery and expert witnesses are named.9s Also, a 
hearing date is selected.96 The regulations further provide that prehear-
ing conferences may be used to resolve "[a]ny other matters that may aid 
in expeditious consideration and determination of the claim. "97 The or-
der produced by the preheamg conference "specifies the agreements 
made at the prehearing conference,"98 and controls "subsequent consid-
eration of the controversy."99 
Next, discovery begins. All discovery must be completed within 270 
days of the date all defendants are served. 1oo Except for this deadline, all 
other discovery rules apply as in the circuit courtS. 101 The panel chair-
man rules on all discovery disputes. 102 
After discovery, the appointed panel is convened on the designated 
date, and the parties present their cases. In most respects, these hearings 
resemble actual trials because each litigant must present his entire case to 
the arbitrators, complete with expert testimony.103 A refusal to present 
evidence before the arbitration panel will result in a dismissal at the trial 
court . level because the party has, "in effect, refused to submit to . . . 
arbitration" as required by the statute. 104 
Whether this line of reasoning will support the proposition that a 
failure to arbitrate part of a claim constitutes a waiver of that issue is 
currently unresolved. It is difficult, however, to understand why the 
94. COMAR, supra note 70, § .03.01.10. 
95. Id. § .03.01.10(C). 
96.Id. 
97. Id. § .03.01.10(C)(1)(g). 
98. Id. § .03.01.10(D). 
99. Id. COMAR provides that the order is binding unless "within 7 days after service 
of the order, a party submits to the Director written objections to the order specify-
ing an error. . . unless, at the hearing, all parties and the chairman agree on modi-
fication of the order." Id. 
100. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(b)(2) (1984). 
101. Id.; COMAR, supra note 70, § .03.01.09(B). 
102. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(b)(2) (1984); COMAR, supra note 70, 
§§ .03.01.08(B), .03.01.09(B). 
103. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1A-05(b)(1) (1984) (incorporating by reference id. 
§§ 3-212 through 3-217, 3-220); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.11. With respect 
to the rules of evidence, the Act and the regulations specify that the arbitration 
panel is not "bound by the technical rules of evidence." MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 3-2A-05(b)(1) (1984) (incorporating by reference id. § 3-214(b»; COMAR, supra 
note 66, § .03.01.11(D)(1); see also Letter from Walter R. Tabler to Aaron M. Le-
vine, P.A. (May 19, 1981) (informal ruling by the Director of the Health Claims 
Arbitration Office that the Manual for Administrative Law Judges (1974) sets forth 
the "appropriate guidelines for hearing under the Act"), reprinted in DECISIONS & 
MATERIALS, supra note 20, at tab marked "References-Law, Regs., Rules, Cases." 
104. Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38,45, 485 A.2d 265, 268 (1984). 
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unarbitrated issues should not be deemed waived. Although it is true 
that the de novo appeal guaranteed by the Act implies the right to a new 
proceeding, it should not be construed to justify reserving part of a case 
for an anticipated action to nullify in the circuit court. Withheld issues 
would not only lead to incomplete panel decisions, but there is always the 
possibility that new claims and theories could be used to ambush an un-
wary opponent in the circuit court. Additionally, if parties are not re-
quired to litigate all aspects of the case before the panel, actions to nullify 
will be more likely because a complete resolution of the case at arbitra-
tion, which might have formed the basis of a settlement, has been ren-
dered impossible. 
At the close of the evidence, the panel renders its decision according 
to the guidelines set forth in the statute and the Code of Maryland Regu-
lations. lOs This decision includes a finding as to liability, and if liability is 
found, the calculation of a dollar figure for damages. 106 Under the appro-
priate circumstances, these damages may include punitive damages and 
costS.107 The panel must also include "an assessment of costs, including 
the arbitrators' fees," in its award. lOS As a final step, the panel is respon-
sible for delivering its award to the Director's Office, which in tum serves 
the award on the parties. lOO 
D. Appeals 
The Act provides that either party "may reject an award for any 
reason" and take what is essentially a de novo appeal to the circuit 
court. 110 The procedures for rejecting a panel decision are well docu-
mented. lll Either strict or substantial compliance with the rules is re-
quired, depending on which rule is at issue, or the right to appeal is 
lost. 112 First, a notice of rejection must be filed with the Director and the 
105. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(d) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.12. 
106. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(d) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01. 12(C). In a case involving multiple parties, if the panel determines that one or 
more of the health care providers is liable, it must apportion responsibility and dam-
ages among the parties. COMAR, supra note 66, § .03.01.12(B-C). 
107. Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp., 44 Md. App. 688, 692, 410 A.2d 630,632 (1980) (puni-
tive damages). 
108. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(e) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01.12(0). The rules governing the awarding of costs were reviewed by the court of 
appeals in Tabler v. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y, 301 Md. 189, 482 A.2d 873 
(1984). 
109. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(t) (1984); COMAR, supra note 66, § .03 
.01.l2(E). The Director is empowered to return the award to the panel if the award 
is defective on its face. Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. 519,490 A.2d 720 
(1985). 
110. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(a) (1984); MD. R.P. BYI-BY5; COMAR, supra 
note 70, § .03.01.14(A). In an action to nullify, unless otherwise stated in the Act, 
the rules of civil procedure apply to all aspects of the case, including the pleadings. 
See Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. 519,490 A.2d 720 (1985). 
111. See supra note 110. 
112. See Tranen v. Aziz, 59 Md. App. 528, 535-38,476 A.2d 1170,1173-75 (1984) (strict 
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arbitration panel and served upon the other parties and their counse1. 113 
All this must take place within "30 days after the award is served upon 
the rejecting party."114 Within the same 30-day period, the appealing 
party must also file "an action. . . to nullify the award" both in the 
circuit court and with the Director. 1lS An action to nullify is the same 
as the filing of a complaint in an action at law. 
Once an appeal has been properly noted, the action to nullify may 
proceed upon three fronts. First, the appellant can move to modify or 
vacate the award on procedural grounds. A motion to modify is appro-
priate when it is evident that the panel committed a mistake that can be 
remedied without affecting the substance of the award. 116 In contrast, a 
motion to vacate is appropriate when there is evidence that: (1) the 
award was procured by culpable acts of the parties; (2) the arbitrators 
were biased or committed similar prejudicial misconduct; (3) the arbitra-
tors exceeded their power; (4) a postponement request was denied im-
properly; (5) prejUdice resulted from a failure to conduct a hearing in the 
prescribed manner; (6) the arbitrators refused to hear evidence material 
to the controversy; or (7) there was no right to arbitration. ll7 To pre-
serve the right to modify or to vacate, the party asserting it must raise it 
by "pretrial preliminary motion." Otherwise, these procedural remedies 
will be deemed to have been waived.1lS 
If a motion to modify or to vacate is granted, the court no longer sits 
in judgment of the arbitration decision. Rather, when a motion to mod-
compliance), cert. granted, 301 Md. 471, 483 A.2d 754 (1985); Mitcherling v. Ros-
selli, 61 Md. App. 113, 121,484 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1984) (substantial compliance). 
Although most of the rules employ the mandatory "shall," the sanction for failure 
to follow the rules is not always dismissal of the action to nullify. Tranen, 59 Md. 
App. at 534-36, 476 A.2d at 1173-74. Rather, dismissal is only warranted when the 
failure to follow the rules will result in the panel decision becoming a final judg-
ment. Mitcherling, 61 Md. App. at 120-21, 484 A.2d at 1063; see Tranen, 59 Md. 
App. at 538, 476 A.2d at 1175. 
113. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(a) (1984); MD. R.P. BY2; COMAR, supra note 
66, § .03.01.14. Service upon the panel members is mandatory, but a failure to effect 
such service does not warrant a dismissal of the action to nullify. Mitcherling V. 
Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113, 118-21,484 A.2d 1060, 1062-64 (1984), cert. granted, 
303 Md. 20,491 A.2d 586 (1985). 
114. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(a) (1984). As an exception to this rule, the Act 
states: "if a timely application for modification or correction has been filed [the 
notice of rejection must be filed] within 10 days after a disposition of the application 
by the panel." [d. 
115. [d. § 3-2A-06(b); see also MD. R.P. BY2(a). This action to nullify, however, must 
be captioned and pleaded in conformity with the applicable rules of procedure. A 
failure to affix the proper caption will result in dismissal only if there is evidence 
that the opposing party was misled. Brothers V. Sinai Hospital, No. 85-1233, slip 
op. (Md. App. May 16, 1985). See Osheroff V. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 62 Md. 519, 
490 A.2d 720 (1985). 
116. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984) (incorporating by reference id. § 3-
223(b». 
117. [d. § 3-2A-06(c) (incorporating by reference id. § 3-224(b)(1-4»; see also Hartman 
V. Cooper's, 59 Md. App. 154,474 A.2d 959 (1984) (articulating the bias standard). 
118. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(c) (1984). 
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ify is granted, and at least one of the parties still wants to proceed with 
the action to nullify, the modified decision becomes the decision in is-
sue. 119 Similarly, when a motion to vacate is granted, the case proceeds 
"as if there had been no award."120 
Second, an appeal may be taken from a granted motion for sum-
mary decision. If the motion was granted improperly, the Act appears to 
command that the panel's decision be vacated and that the trial of the 
case in the circuit court "proceed as if there had been no award."121 One 
case, however, implies in dictum that, once the summary judgment is 
reversed, the claim can be remanded to the panel for arbitration. 122 This 
is troubling because no authority exists to justify remanding a claim to 
the arbitration panel. By contrast, the judicial review provisions in other 
arbitration and administrative acts expressly empower the circuit courts 
to remand cases to arbitrators and agencies. 123 It can be inferred that, by 
failing to grant circuit courts the authority to remand cases to health 
claims arbitration panels, the General Assembly intended to prohibit 
such remands. 
Lastly, assuming that the award hasnot been vacated, the party who 
lost before the panel must rebut the presumption of correctness accorded 
the decision of the arbitration panel. I24 Because this presumption shifts 
the burden of proof,125 it was the subject of an initial constitutional chal-
lenge to the Act. 126 The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected an argu-
ment that the presumption violated the right to jury trial, and noted that 
"[t]his provision only establishes a rebuttable presumption. It cuts off no 
defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues and 
takes no question off act from either court or jury."127 In short, the mere 
shifting of the burden of proof does not deprive the parties of the right to 
have their entire case evaluated by a jury. 128 
119.Id. 
120.Id. 
121. See Id. (incorporating by reference id. § 3-224(b)(3-4». This is consistent with a bill 
pending before the legislature to permit panel chairmen to enter summary decisions. 
SBI6, 1985 Legislative term. Only the summary decision component of this bill was 
adopted as SB866, ch. 104, 1985 Md. Laws 1246. 
122. See Stifter v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19, 25,488 A.2d 192, 195 (1985). Apparently, 
the authority to remand is based on the need to exhaust the administrative remedy 
before the panel. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,91-92,447 A.2d 860,865 
(1982); Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 322-23,452 A.2d 1302, 1304-05 (1982). 
123. See, e.g., MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-225 (Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act); 
MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 1O-215(g)(I) (1984) (Administrative Procedure 
Act); MD. R.P. B13. 
124. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984). 
125. Hahn v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 692-93, 461 A.2d 7, 11-12 (1983); 
MD. R.P. BY5. 
126. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 
805 (1978). 
127. Id. at 294-95, 385 A.2d at 69 (quoting Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 
412, 430 (1915». 
128. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274,294,385 A.2d 57, 69, appeal dismissed, 439 
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This presumption of correctness becomes important in two contexts. 
First, it shifts the burden of going forward. Hence, unless the party seek-
ing to overturn the panel's decision rebuts the presumption by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, a directed verdict will be entered against him.129 
A health care provider who was unsuccessful at the panel level therefore 
comes to the circuit court burdened with a presumption that he was neg-
ligent. Second, the presumption of correctness creates an incentive for 
plaintiffs to appeal the amount of a panel award in their favor. Once the 
jury is instructed that the panel should be presumed correct, plaintiffs 
counsel can attempt to use the panel's award as a floor from which to 
argue that additional compensation is warranted. 
V. THE EXPERIMENT FAILS 
The Maryland General Assembly created the health claims arbitra-
tion system in an effort to remedy the problems associated with the com-
mon law method of handling medical malpractice suits.130 The 
investigation into these inadequacies did not occur overnight. A commit-
tee was formed, and the report it published became the genesis of the 
Maryland Act. l3l In the Maryland General Assembly, verbal and writ-
ten testimony was submitted to a number of legislative committees, and 
several bills were drafted.132 All sectors of the industry contributed to 
this search for an answer. Physicians, medical associations, spiritual 
healers, insurance carriers, and attorneys all presented their views of 
what should be done. 
After sifting through this plethora of data, the Act's framers identi-
fied several goals that they believed could be achieved through arbitra-
tion. First, at the very least, the legislators expected arbitration to result 
in less crowded court dockets because malpractice claims would be rele-
gated to an alternative forum. 133 Second, the presence of a health care 
provider and an attorney on the panel was designed to replace perceived 
juror irrationality with a working majority of dispassionate, level-headed 
experts. This, in turn, would reduce the number of meritless claims that 
U.S. 80S (1978). For a general discussion of the right to jury trial, see C. BROWN, 
INTRODUCTION TO MARYLAND CIVIL LITIGATION § S.l1 (1982). 
129. Hahn v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 692-93, 461 A.2d 7, 11-12 (1983). 
130. Many of these problems are outlined in Abraham, supra note 26, at 495-512. 
131. The Committee was termed the Medical Malpractice Insurance Study Committee. 
It was appointed by the President of the Maryland Senate and the Speaker of the 
State's House of Delegates as a special task force on medical malpractice. 1976 
REpORT, supra note 18, at 1. The report was published on January 6, 1976. A copy 
is available at the Maryland State Law Library, Courts of Appeal Building, Annap-
olis, Maryland (indexed Md. Y3.Ma 25:21B 1976). 
132. The written testimony has been compiled in folders that are indexed under the bill 
numbers. These files are maintained by the Maryland Legislative Reference Service, 
located in the Legislative Services Building, Annapolis, Maryland. 
133. 1976 REPORT, supra note 18, at 4; Abraham, supra note 26, at 514; Quinn, supra 
note 29, at 78; Weston, Health Claims Arbitration - The View from the Panel 
Chairman, MD. ST. B.J., June 1981, at 6. 
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were based solely upon impassioned pleas for juror sympathy.134 More-
over, it was hoped that the removal of the sympathy element from the 
deliberative process, would result in considerably smaller awards than 
those given by juries. 13S Finally, the removal offrivolous claims from the 
system, combined with the informal rules of procedure and evidence ap-
plied in panel hearings, was designed to speed the access to justice for 
patients with bona fide claims. 136 In short, it was hoped that expert arbi-
tration panels would have greater success in reaching fair results in mal-
practice cases. 
Experience has shown, however, that the arbitration system has 
failed to meet its objectives. Rather than clearing malpractice claims 
from the court dockets, the arbitration system has merely served as an 
expensive hurdle that must be cleared before filing suit in court. Accord-
ing to recent reports, more than 50% of the cases in which panel hear- . 
ings were held have been appealed. 137 The primary reason for this lack 
of finality is the Act's presumption of correctness. It fails to sufficiently 
deter appeals from panel decisions. 
A defendant who loses a major case at the panel level loses little by 
appealing. l38 He risks only an increase, by the jury, of the panel's award. 
To the plaintiff, win or lose, there is no deterrent to appealing to the 
circuit court. If the plaintiff lost before the panel, the presumption of 
correctness will merely place the burden of proof where it would have 
been at common law, on the patient; whether by operation of the com-
mon law or by the Act, the patient has the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption that the health care provider acted with due care. 139 If the 
patient won below, the size of the panel's award and the presumption of 
correctness can serve as a springboard to a substantially higher damages 
award by a jury. 140 Moreover, once the jury learns that the physician is 
134. 1976 REPORT, supra note 18, at 1. One commentator believed that the attorneys' 
ability to manipulate the empathy of the jury was the "cause of this crisis." Com-
ments of Doctors' Hospital of Prince George's County 3 (1976) (available in Mary-
land Legislative Reference File HB986C). 
135. See Quinn, supra note 29, at 78-79; Shadoan, Medical Malpractice Arbitration -
Free at Last?, MD. ST. B.J., Feb. 1981, at 5. 
136. See LEGISLATIVE STUDY GROUP, ISSUE REpORT 3 (Feb. 18, 1976) (available in 
Maryland Legislative Reference File SB 436); MCGUIRK & RAFFERTY, supra note 
26, at 15. 
137. ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 14 LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 
11, at app. H; see also Editorial Comment, Medical Malpractice Crisis. Cure or 
Merely the "Eye o/the Storm?," 24 DEF. L.J. 175, 177 (1980) (commenting on the 
large number of appeals in Maryland). 
138. LEGISLATIVE STUDY GROUP, ISSUE REPORT 6 (Feb. 18, 1976) (available in Mary-
land Legislative Reference File SB436). 
139. See Paige v. Manuzak, 57 Md. App. 621, 641, 471 A.2d 758, 768 (1984). 
140. Comments of the Medical Practice Action Committee, Inc. 2 (Feb. 2, 1976) (avail-
able in Maryland Legislative Reference File HB986). The fear is that the jury "will 
likely accept the panel's finding of negligence (the court must instruct the jury that 
such finding is presumed correct) and will, therefore, concentrate solely and exclu-
sively on the issue of damages." Id; see also Statement of Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Esquire, Vice Chairman of the Maryland State Bar Association Special Committee 
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presumed to be negligent, the malpractice case is ultimately decided by 
the same "impassioned" jurors that the framers of the Act sought to ex-
clude from the decision-making process; only now the jurors are told that 
they are to presume that the health care provider was negligent. Evi-
dently, and not surprisingly, plaintiffs have become aware of this weak-
ness in the arbitration system, because recent statistics show that 
plaintiffs are as likely to appeal awards in their favor as defendants are to 
appeal awards against the health care provider. 141 
Mounting evidence indicates that the Health Claims Arbitration 
Act has created a climate that encourages the filing of malpractice suits. 
A surge in the number of malpractice claims being filed since the advent 
of arbitration reflects this development. For example, the average annual 
number of claims filed at common law was between 50 and 60 per 
year. 142 According to the latest statistics, over 550 new health claims 
were filed in 1983 alone. 143 In a recent report, the Department of Budget 
& Fiscal planning cautioned that 86% of all cases filed in the health 
claims arbitration office are resolved through the arbitration process 
without appeal. l44 This figure is deceptive because it implies that all 
these claims were meritorious. Quite the opposite was actually true. Of 
these cases, 35% were dismissed and 39% settled. 14S Only 24%, or 182 
of the 774 cases filed with the arbitration office between 1976 and Janu-
ary 1, 1983 were actually concluded by panel hearing. 146 And actions to 
nullify were filed in 106 (over 50%) of these panel cases. 147 Thus, the 
panel hearing process itself, when called upon to resolve a dispute, failed 
in more than half of its attempts. Not only are more cases being filed, 
but a higher percentage of these cases are being decided in favor of plain-
tiffs. At common law, defendant health care providers prevailed in 80% 
to 90% of the cases. 148 The latest statistics reveal that, under the arbitra-
tion system, plaintiffs now win approximately 42% of the cases. 149 
Clearly, a heightened expectation of winning encourages the indecisive, 
putative claimant to file suit. 
The prospect of a large award from the arbitration panel adds to 
to Consider Problems Related to Medical Malpractice in Maryland 3-4 (1976) 
(available in Maryland Legislative Reference File HB986). 
141. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at app. H. 
142. [d. at 14; 1976 REPORT, supra note 18, at 7; LEGISLATIVE STUDY GROUP, ISSUE 
REPORT (Feb. 18, 1976) (1973 and 1974 statistics) (available in Maryland Legisla-
tive Reference File SB436). For the years 1970-75, an average of just over 60 mal-
practice claims per year were filed in Maryland courts against hospitals, physicians, 
and surgeons. 
143. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at app. F. There is evidence that this surge in 
litigation is not limited to Maryland. Middleton, supra note 38. 
144. ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 14. 
145. [d. at 9 (2% were settled during the hearing). 
146. [d. 
147. /d. at 14 (statistical breakdown on what happened to cases "Appealed from Health 
Claims Arbitration"). 
148. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 15; 1976 REPORT, supra note 18, at 7. 
149. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 15. 
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these temptations to litigate. Rather than adopting the miserly approach 
that the Act's framers hoped the arbitrators would take, panel members 
are considerably more generous than their juror counterparts. ISO Fur-
thermore, since the advent of arbitration, the State has witnessed a rec-
ord number of panel awards in excess of one million dollars. lSI In short, 
not only have the panels been more likely to find health care providers 
negligent, but they also appear inclined to award more generous 
compensation. 
Perh<.;?s the most glaring problem with the State's approach to arbi-
tration is its failure to provide patients with swift access to justice. First, 
due in part to a backlog in the system, it is not uncommon for the arbi-
tration process to drag on for upwards of eighteen months from the time 
a claim is filed until the arbitration process is concluded. ls2 This period 
of time adds to the average two years of investigation and preparation 
that precedes the filing of most claims. 1S3 Hence, without an appeal, an 
injured patient, who is often saddled with high medical bills and a disa-
bility that prevents him from working, must wait more than three and 
one-half years before obtaining a remedy. 
Second, because appeals from panel decisions occur in more than 
half of the cases that are decided by the panel, the patient's wait fre-
quently does not end with the panel's decision. Instead, for the reasons 
outlined above, panel decisions too often wind up in circuit court to be 
tried de novo. As a result, the waiting period is extended until the matter 
has been litigated in court. And, according to data supplied by the 
Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts, comparable negligence 
cases must wait an average of nineteen months before coming to tria1. IS4 
Thus, at this time, the injured patient cannot count on having his injuries 
redressed for at least seven years. 
Both sides pay a high cost for playing this waiting game. Because 
hearings before the arbitration panels are tried as though they were being 
litigated in court, all the expenses alluded to at the beginning of this arti-
cle must be incurred. The litigants must retain experts to testify, conduct 
investigations, take depositions, and wage discovery battles. Moreover, 
litigants must incur these astronomical expenses twice: once at the panel 
level and again when the entire case is retried de novo in the circuit court. 
In an action to nullify, the same, if not more, experts must be retained 
and discovery disputes are reopened. Understandably, there is a sizable 
financial incentive to settle. 
150. Id. at 13-14. 
151. Id. at app. P; DECISIONS & MATERIALS, supra note 20. For a summary of the size 
of pre-arbitration verdicts, see LIEBMANN REpORT, supra note 11, at app. S. These 
large verdicts are reflected in a nationwide rise in awards. Middleton, supra note 38, 
at 9-10. 
152. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 12-13. For an explanation of the causes of 
this delay, see ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 8-13. 
153. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at app. N. 
154. ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 11. 
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All of these problems have resulted in a system fraught with delay 
and duplication, a system with which no one is satisfied. Large panel 
awards coupled with a high plaintiff success rate have done little to dis-
courage the filing of frivolous malpractice suits. Indeed, recent findings 
show that the arbitration system has actually contributed to the filing of 
such suits. ISS More importantly, the experiment has failed to keep a sig-
nificant number of malpractice cases out of court. Frequent appeals have 
resulted in health care providers and their insurers again being sUbjected 
to the vagaries and inequities of the common law. Now, however, the 
health care providers are statistically less successful than they were 
before arbitration. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Over the last few years, it has become increasingly apparent to a 
number of critics that Maryland's health claims arbitration system is fail-
ing to achieve its goals. The Act's detractors have armed themselves 
with proposals that range from making minor procedural revisions to 
scrapping the entire arbitration system. IS6 To understand these sug-
gested changes, each must be examined separately in terms of the justifi-
cations for creating health claims arbitration. 
A. Modification of the Panel Makeup 
Common sense dictates that the quality of a health claims arbitra-
tion decision is only as high as the capability of the panel called upon to 
make it. It is the panel members who must sift through the evidence and 
arrive at a decision. If they are unqualified or lack the guidance of spe-
cific standards, both the parties and the system suffer from erroneous and 
inconsistent decisions. The appealing party incurs the burden of arguing 
that a decision, which the jury is told is presumptively correct, is actually 
wrong. Also, the system loses because, in the eyes of the legal commu-
nity and the public, its results appear arbitrary and inconsistent. The 
public perceives that the arbitration system has failed to find the truth, 
and more importantly, that it has failed to achieve justice. 
Because panel members are volunteers, it seems ungrateful to criti-
cize their performance. Yet, perhaps because the job is voluntary, the 
Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office has experienced consid-
155. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 14. 
156. A number of panels and commentators have criticized the Act and encouraged 
either its abolition or modification. See, e.g., ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra 
note 70, at 34-47 (modification); Medical Malpractice Task Force (1983) (modifica-
tion) [hereinafter cited as MCGUIRK REpORT]; King, Suggested Amendments to the 
Health Claims Arbitration Act, MD. ST. B.J., Fe~. 1981, at 4 (modification); King, 
The Health Claims Arbitration Act: Is it a Rose?, MD. ST. MED. J., Sept. 1982, at 38, 
40 (abolition); MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
ON HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION app. A (1984), reprinted in 89 TRANSACTIONS 
133, 143 (1984) (abolition) [hereinafter cited as MSBA]; Weston, supra note 133, at 
8. 
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erable difficulty in attracting qualified medical and legal professionals to 
hear panel cases. IS7 Furthermore, the lists of lay persons prepared by the 
Director bear no resemblance to jury lists. This is because the names are 
assembled from applications filed by lay persons interested in serving on 
panels. Thus, the lay panel member lists are not representative of a 
cross-section of the community. 
1. The Professionals on the Panel 
A number of solutions have been proposed to improve the panel 
recruitment process. Before examining them, it is important to recognize 
the purposes for a health care provider and an attorney on the panel. 
Neither of these professionals is there to advance the respective interests 
of his or her profession. Rather, their presence exists to provide the ex-
pertise necessary to unravel the complexities of the case. ISS The health 
care provider should offer insight into the medical complexities. In a 
complicated case, however, a health care provider who does not practice 
the same specialty as the defendant is often of limited use to the panel. 
For example, most pediatricians would be less than qualified to assist the 
other panel members in a case involving allegations of negligent failure to 
diagnose adult lung cancer. Clearly, the panel would be better served by 
a trained oncologist. 
As panel chairman, the attorney's skill and qualifications are espe-
cially important because he must preside over the panel hearing and re-
solve all issues of law. ls9 Additionally, the complexity of malpractice 
cases, coupled with the level of experience prevalent among attorneys 
who litigate them, suggest that only highly trained panel chairmen 
should be selected. Hence, he must not only be learned in the law of the 
case, he must be a sophisticated jurist as well. 
A recent special report of the Maryland State Bar Association 160 
recommended that attorneys and health care providers be drawn from 
lists of those licensed to practice these professions. 161 Once selected for 
duty, the professional would be required to serve, unless "good cause to 
the contrary is shown by the [professional]."162 This proposal overlooks 
two important considerations. First, it does not attempt to identify panel 
members who have the skills needed to make a meaningful contribution 
to the case. Instead, under the Bar Association proposal, the candidates 
are to be selected at random from each of the professional pools. 163 As a 
result, panels may be made up of health care providers who have little 
157. See LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 28; MCGUIRK REPORT, supra note 156, 
at 1; King, The Health Claims Arbitration Act: Is it a Rose?, supra note 156, at 39; 
MSBA, supra note 156, at 133-34. 
158. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra note 47. 
160. MSBA, supra note 156. 
161. Id. at 134, 136-37. 
162. Id. at 134. 
163. Id. at 136. 
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knowledge about the medical specialty in question, and attorneys who 
have no experience in malpractice litigation, let alone the training neces-
sary to be a good judge. Under the Bar Association proposal, there 
would be an increased likelihood both that the panel would fail to under-
stand the medical issues, and that the attorney's inexperience would pro-
duce a wealth of appeals on procedural questions. 
A more effective approach to the professional panel member recruit-
ment problem is to identify health care providers and attorneys who can 
effectively fulfill their respective roles. 1M With regard to health care 
providers, the recruitment effort must be aimed at identifying and solicit-
ing health care providers who share the defendant's specialty.165 If vol-
unteers do not come forward, a budget should be created to compensate 
these experts. 166 The expenses incurred by the fund should be taxable as 
costs against the parties. 167 
The attorney should also be selected from a pool of applicants who 
have the appropriate qualifications: knowledge of malpractice law and 
judicial training. 168 These skills should be acquired through actual court 
experience, though some classroom or seminar training might be used to 
ameliorate lack of experience. Once selected and trained, these quasi-
judicial arbitrators would be massed into a pool that could be drawn 
upon when the need arises, much like the equity master system currently 
in force. 169 
Second, the Bar Association errs in suggesting mandatory service by 
health care providers and attorneys on health claims arbitration 
panels. 17o Aside from reflecting a certain amount of naivete about the 
practicalities of the respective professions, the suggested system of draft-
ing professionals to serve on panels would certainly involve persons who 
would be as unconcerned about health claims arbitration generally as 
they would be about the merits of the individual case to which they are 
164. This is done in a number of states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(g) (1983); 
N.Y. Clv. PRAC. LAW § 148-a(2) (McKinney 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7001 
(Supp. 1984). 
165. The Maryland Act provides that the Director should make an effort to "include 
persons in the specialty on the list [of panel candidates] from the health care pro-
vider category." MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04 (1984). 
166. Many states compensate on a per diem basis. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-
109(a) (1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.03(3)(c) 
(West Supp. 1984-85). 
167. The Bar Association of Baltimore City requested that all panel members be profes-
sional arbitrators. Letter from Geoffrey S. Mitchell to the Honorable Joseph Owens 
(March 31, 1976) (available in Maryland Legislative Reference File HB986). 
168. It might be wise to limit the pool to retired members of the jUdiciary. Under the 
health claims arbitration statutes in other states, only judges or retired judges serve 
as panel chairmen. Kg., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983); VA. 
CODE § 8.01-581.3(ii) (1984). In Maryland, though, the active judge is precluded 
by the canons of judicial conduct from serving on an arbitration panel. MD. R.P. 
1231, Canon XXV. 
169. See MD. R.P. 2-541. 
170. MSBA, supra note 156, at 134, 136. 
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involuntarily assigned. This minimum effort attitude would not only rob 
the panel of the meaningful insight of the professional, but, without a 
careful appraisal of the merits of a given case by the health care provider 
or attorney, the likelihood of erroneous decision would be increased sub-
stantially. Moreover, absent a plan to select only those arbitrators who 
can unravel the complexities of an individual case, the compulsory panel 
member's expertise could easily be wasted on a case involving an unre-
lated specialty. The Bar Association would require highly specialized 
professionals to serve on panels with no guarantee that they would be 
able to contribute anything more to the panel's decision than the lay 
panel member. 
Rather than the Bar Association's involuntary arbitrators, what is 
needed is a rethinking of the existing voluntary service system. An inten-
sive and expansive public relations campaign might net a handful of qual-
ified professionals. Retired judges, medical and law school professors, 
and senior attorneys would be the best targets of this recruitment drive. 
It is unrealistic, however, to expect that most health care providers and 
attorneys will serve purely as volunteers. 171 The compensation provided 
for these specialists could take either the form of monetary remuneration 
or credit toward certification as a specialist. Monetary remuneration 
could be structured to track the fee system in existence in the given pro-
fession}72 Nurses would be paid the market rate for nurses, doctors the 
market rate for doctors, and attorneys the market rate for attorneys. The 
funding for these fees could be apportioned among the parties as costs, 
paid for out of general revenues, or both.173 
2. The Layman on the Panel 
Under the current system, anyone who volunteers to serve as a panel 
member will usually be allowed to sit. The result of this purely voluntary 
system is that, unlike jurors, lay panel members are not representative of 
the community at large. 
In contrast to the professional members of the panel, the lay mem-
ber is supposed to lack any specific skill or expertise in medicine or law. 
Indeed, the Health Claims Arbitration Act expressly precludes health 
care providers and attorneys from filling the seat of the lay panel mem-
171. According to a recent report of the Maryland State Bar Association, the current 
Director of Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration Office admits the failure of the 
all-volunteer system. MSBA, supra note 156, at 134; see also ARBITRATION OFFICE 
STUDY, supra note 70, at 35 (noting that Director's major problem is that panel 
members are unvailable to serve when contacted). 
172. For a sampling of the different per diem schedules, see supra note 166. 
173. Costs are apportioned in this manner under the current system. COMAR, supra 
note 70, § .03.01.12(0). Some states concur, see VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10 (1984), 
and some differ, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.304 (Purdon Supp. 1984) (health 
care providers finance the arbitration panels); S.D. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-25 
(1979) (costs paid out of general funds). See supra note 166 (detailing approaches 
taken by other states). 
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berP4 In contrast to the problems associated with requiring profession-
als to serve on panels, a compulsory system for selection of the laymen 
can produce qualified panel members. In fact, a similar compulsory sys-
tem has worked in other contexts for centuries in the form of compulsory 
jury service. 
Recognizing these considerations, the Bar Association concludes 
that lay panel members should be drawn from the jury lists kept by the 
circuit courtsP5 Once selected, the lay members would be compensated 
at the same rate paid to jurorsP6 So long as persons selected for panel 
work were given credit for jury service, requiring them to serve on arbi-
tration panels would work no hardship upon them. In essence, the lay 
panel designees would be in the same position as if they had been called 
for jury service. 
B. Discovery 
Much has been written in recent years about the abuses of the rules 
of discovery. 177 First, discovery is costly. Stenographic costs for deposi-
tions alone often runs into thousands of dollars for each side. Second, 
skirmishes frequently take place over what is properly discoverable and 
what can properly be protected. 
Medical malpractice cases are no exception. With both sides con-
sulting and calling sophisticated experts and lay witnesses, and the large 
amount of documentary evidence, extensive use of discovery and discov-
ery disputes frequently occur in malpractice cases. 178 Like all legal dis-
putes, these squabbles cause higher costs to the parties and, more 
importantly, delay. Because of the duplicative system created by a de 
novo appeal to the circuit courts, the Health Claims Arbitration Act has 
exacerbated the problems with discovery by multiplying discovery dis-
putes. Also, because discovery conducted at the arbitration level is not 
binding on the parties in the circuit court, discovery is reopened when an 
action to nullify is filed. 179 Litigants must depose newly called experts, 
and may relitigate, at trial, discovery disputes lost at the panel level. 
One way to cut the cost and delay imposed by dual discovery is to 
make discovery at the panel level binding upon the parties in the circuit 
174. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-2A-03(c) (1984); COMAR, supra note 70, 
§ .03.01.07(A)(2)(a). 
175. MSBA, supra note 156, at 137. It should be noted, however, that the current juror 
stipends are ridiculously out of touch with the market rate for a working person's 
time. 
176. Id. 
177. For a recent symposium on the topic, see National Conference on Discovery Reform, 
3 REv. LITIGATION 1 (1982). 
178. The Act, however, limits the period for discovery to 270 days. MD. Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-2A-05(b)(2) (1984). 
179. This is a result of the de novo review accorded health claims cases in the circuit 
court. See supra note 116. 
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court. 180 In other words, it could be made very difficult for parties to 
name new experts or to conduct additional discovery in the circuit 
courts. For example, these tactics might be limited by requiring a show-
ing of prejudice or substantial injustice before new experts could be 
named. This, of course, would have the effect of forcing all sides to pull 
out all the stops, as it were, and hold nothing back at the arbitration 
level. Unnamed experts and concealed discovery tactics could not be 
saved for an anticipated trial in the circuit courts. 
By compelling the parties to complete their discovery before the 
panel, this proposed limitation closely resembles a typical non-de novo 
appeal from an administrative tribunal. Although the parties would be 
free to appeal on the evidence in the record, they would not be free to 
supplement the record with evidence concealed from the arbitrators. As 
a consequence, panels would be presented with more complete records 
and parties would not have to fear being ambushed at a later date by the 
use of new evidence in the action to nullify. 
A flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that the arbitration level is 
the best place to resolve a malpractice dispute. Unfortunately, history 
reveals that of the cases that have been fully litigated and decided by 
panels, many are appealed. By providing for a de novo appeal, the Gen-
eral Assembly has, in effect, removed a major incentive to accept the 
finality of an unfavorable health claims decision. Because there is a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial, a standard of review that accorded more 
deference to a panel's decision would likely be declared unconstitu-
tional. I81 With this constitutional limitation in mind, requiring a com-
plete and unrestrained litigation of malpractice suits before arbitration 
panels may represent a misconception of the forum in which the case 
must ultimately be decided. 
c. Certificate of Merit 
A difficulty that plagued the circuit courts under the common law, 
and one that continues under the present arbitration system, is the prob-
lem posed by frivolous claims. 182 These claims are filed with little hope 
of success. Instead, it is hoped that the defendant's insurance carrier will 
settle for a sum below the cost of having the claim dismissed. 
Under the current system, it is very simple to play this game. Once 
a claim is filed, discovery proceeds and costs mount. Often, it is only 
after this expensive discovery process that the defendant will learn of the 
fatal weaknesses in the plaintiff's case, or, more importantly, that the 
180. See LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 30. 
181. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. Other states have gone further and 
completely barred any mention of the arbitration panel's decision. See MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-6-704 (2) (1983). Indeed, some states declare that the panel's deci-
sion is made without authority and therefore is non-binding. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41-5-20(0 (1978). 
182. See supra text accompanying note 155; LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 14-16. 
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plaintiff has no expert. Indeed, the current rules of discovery do not re-
quire the naming of an expert until it is requested in discovery.ls3 As a 
result, a claim can be filed before the plaintiff has even had a physician's 
opinion on the merits of the case. 
A number of commentators have called for the adoption of a certifi-
cate of merit requirement to eliminate some of this abuse. IS4 Under this 
rule, a plaintiff would have to obtain the opinion of an expert before filing 
suit. The expert would have to certify, under oath, that he has reviewed 
the merits of the case and concluded that there is probable malpractice. 
Of course, the certificate would not be required in cases where malprac-
tice could be proved without the aid of expert testimony. ISS 
The certificate of merit requirement is a good idea. It is true that it 
imposes the added cost of hiring an expert before a case is filed, and there 
is a possibility that this added cost could raise the cost of settlement. The 
cost of the expert, however, is one which the serious plaintiff must bear 
sooner or later. The certificate requirement merely mandates that the 
expert be retained sooner. In addition, with Maryland's rejection of the 
strict locality rule, finding an expert should not prove to be a difficult 
chore. IS6 Thus, the certificate of merit proposal will fulfill its purpose by 
forcing the plaintiff to test the merits of his case on an expert before he 
tests them on the panel. 
D. The Collateral Source Rule 
Although it is only tangentially related to malpractice cases, the col-
lateral source rule has become an issue in the current fight to amend the 
Health Claims Arbitration Act. The rule is a fairly simple one, requiring 
that any monies received from the injured party's insurer cannot be of-
fered by the defense to reduce damages. IS7 In short, a defendant cannot 
urge the trier of fact to subtract from its award any amount received by 
the patient from his own insurer. ISS The reason behind the rule is that 
plaintiffs should not be penalized, and defendants should not be unjustly 
enriched, simply because the plaintiff was prudent enough to purchase 
insurance. ls9 The practical effect is that the plaintiff is allowed to recover 
183. MD. R.P. 2-402(e). 
184. Letter from John J. Sellinger to Chairman V. Mike Miller, Jr. and Members of the 
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (April 6, 1984) (available in Maryland Leg-
islative Reference File SBl003IHBI527); Addendum to letter from William I. Wes-
ton to The Honorable Thomas V. Mike Miller and the Members of the Judicial 
Proceedings Committee (March 1, 1984) (available in Maryland Legislative Refer-
ence File SBl003IHBI527). 
185. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
187. American Paving & Contracting Co. v. Davis, 127 Md. 477, 96 A. 623 (1916); Balti-
more City Passenger Ry. v. Baer, 90 Md. 97,44 A. 992 (1899). 
188. Abraham, supra note 26, at 504-05. 
189. 3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 17.00 (M. Minzer ed. 1984). 
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twice: once from his insurer and a second time from the defendant. 190 
The proponents of change argue that the collateral source rule 
should be eliminated in malpractice suits so that costs might be re-
duced. 191 Because malpractice is an area in which the costs have already 
exceeded all reasonable limitations, these proponents of change argue 
that the collateral source rule gives an unaffordable windfall to plain-
tiffs.192 In addition, they attack the rationale for the rule. They argue 
that patients, when purchasing insurance, do not assume that they will be 
the victims of malpractice. Because they assume that their doctor will 
conform his conduct to the applicable standard of care,193 patients will 
continue to buy health insurance, regardless of whether the collateral 
source rule applies to malpractice suits. 
Encouraging the purchase of insurance, however, is only part of the 
justification behind the collateral source rule. The remaining justification 
for the rule, that the defendant should not benefit from the plaintitrs 
foresight in obtaining insurance, remains unaddressed. If the collateral 
source rule is completely repealed, the negligent physician will be en-
riched by the patient's health insurance. 
This is unjust for two reasons. First, the proponents of change can 
point to no reason for carving out an exception to the collateral source 
rule for malpractice plaintiffs. It is true that the costs of litigation are 
exorbitant; however, they are exorbitant in other areas of the law as well. 
The arguments based on the unfairness of the plaintiff's double recovery 
in a medical malpractice case are nothing more than a restatement of the 
arguments against the collateral source rule in general.194 There is no 
compelling reason for excepting malpractice suits from the rule's scope. 
Second, there is no reason why the negligent physician should not be 
responsible for the entire injury he has caused. One of the central themes 
of tort law is that the one who negligently causes an injury should pay 
the claim. 195 Thus, it is unfair to ask the plaintiff's insurer to pay a claim 
for which it bears no responsibility, while the responsible party is saved 
that part of his or her costs. 
The more equitable solution is to place the entire cost of the loss on 
the defendant and his malpractice insurer. Malpractice law is aimed at 
compensating patients, not enriching them. Accordingly, the problem 
190. It should be noted, however, that most health insurance policies contain subroga-
tion clauses that permit the insurer to recover any amount it has paid the insured. 
191. Abraham, supra note 26, at 505-06. 
192. See id.; Comment, supra note 28, at 668-69. 
193. Comment, supra note 28, at 666. 
194. DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 177, § 17.04; Statement of Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Esquire, Vice Chainnan of the Maryland State Bar Association Special 
Committee to Consider Problems Related to Medical Malpractice in Maryland 6 
(Feb. 24, 1976) ("there is no reason to believe that the collateral source rule imposes 
a particular hardship on defendants in malpractice cases") (available in Maryland 
Legislative Reference File HB986). 
195. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 9, § 2. 
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can be solved by awarding a full judgment against the defendant. The 
plaintiff would then be required to repay his insurer any payments re-
ceived from that insurer, to the extent that the recovery from the errant 
physician was sufficient to cover them. Because the plaintiff litigated the 
case for the benefit of his insurer, a pro rata share of the litigation costs 
could be subtracted from this payment to the insurer. Under this system, 
the plaintiff would be compensated, his insurer would break even, and 
the defendant would bear the full cost of his negligence. 
E. Rules of Evidence 
In general, arbitration is praised for its informality. Not everyone, 
however, praises this lack of structure. 196 Because the panels are not 
bound by the formal rules of evidence, they can consider evidence that 
could never be admitted at trial. I97 Proponents argue that this flexibility 
allows the arbitrators to consider a wide range of information in their 
search for the truth. 198 Moreover, the two knowledgeable experts on the 
panel are less likely to be as improperly influenced by otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence as jury members would be if they were to view the same 
evidence. 
Yet, just as flexibility opens the door to more information, it also 
creates a situation where the panel decision can be based on evidence that 
would be inadmissible in court. For example, because panel hearings are 
not governed by the technical rules of evidence, it is conceivable that a 
panel's decision could be based solely on hearsay evidence. 199 The prob-
lem is that, although the evidence is not admissible in court, the panel 
decision is, and the jury is instructed that it is presumed to be correct.200 
Thus, the party bringing an action to nullify the panel decision is placed 
in the uncomfortable position of having to rebut a presumption that 
would not exist if the rules of evidence had been enforced at the panel 
level.201 
To remedy this problem, some critics argue that the rules of evi-
196. See LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note II, at 26-27; MSBA, supra note 156, at 141-42. 
197. See supra note 103. 
198. See supra note 103 (letter from the current Director); Letter from William I. Wes-
ton to The Honorable Thomas V. Mike Miller and Members of the Judicial Pro-
ceedings Committee (March I, 1984) (available in Maryland Leglislative Reference 
File SBl003IHBI527). 
199. Under accepted administrative law principles, "not only is hearsay evidence admis-
sible in administrative hearings but. . . such evidence, if credible and of sufficient 
probative force, may indeed be the sole basis for the decision of an administrative 
body." Tauber v. County Bd. of Appeals, 257 Md. 202, 213, 262 A.2d 513, 518 
(1970) (quoting Eger v. Stone, 253 Md. 533, 542, 253 A.2d 372,377 (1969»; see also 
Redding v. Board of County Comm'rs, 263 Md. 94, 110-11. 282 A.2d 136, 145 
(1971). Whether a health claims arbitration panel is governed by administrative 
common law has yet to be expressly decided. One case, however, suggests that it 
would apply by analogy. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,91,447 A.2d 860, 
865 (1982). 
200. See notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
201. Comment, supra note 28, at 681. 
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dence should be applied in proceedings before the panels.202 Undoubt-
edly, this would remedy the problem created by having a panel decision 
introduced that is based on inadmissible evidence. Also, it would pro-
vide a formalized set of rules to guide panel chairmen.203 Another way 
to avoid admitting into court a panel decision that is based on inadmissi-
ble evidence is to simply prohibit any mention of the panel's decision in 
court.204 
Both of these proposals may create more problems than they solve. 
First, the application of the rules of evidence to arbitration hearings will 
only obscure the search for the truth, and destroy the existing informal-
ity. Second, if complaints concerning the lack of judicial training among 
panel chairmen are at all founded, there will surely be a large number of 
appeals based on erroneous evidentiary rulings. Although the existing 
Act contains no mechanisms to explain how the circuit court should dis-
pose of erroneous evidentiary rulings by panel chairmen, it is likely that 
the court would vacate the panel decision and proceed as though there 
had been no arbitration hearing.205 In other words, all the funds and 
efforts devoted to arbitrating would be lost because of a technical error. 
Evidentiary rulings should be left to those who are trained to make them: 
the trial court judges. 
Third, prohibiting any mention in court of the product of an arbitra-
tion hearing would destroy what little value the current arbitration sys-
tem has as a mechanism for resolving disputes. It is difficult enough 
under the existing system to rationalize requiring parties to litigate a case 
before the arbitration tribunal, only to obtain a presumption of correct-
ness in the circuit court. Removal of the presumption would be a re-
moval of the already inadequate reward for arbitrating. There would be 
no reason to settle in the face of an unfavorable ruling; at worst, all that 
could occur in the circuit court is that the jurors would reach the same 
conclusion as the panel. Also, it is difficult to justify requiring parties to 
incur the enormous expenses associated with litigating a malpractice case 
and then deny them the opportunity to use the decision. Barring any 
202. See, e.g., LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 26; MSBA, supra note 156, at 141-
42. Some states apply the rules of evidence. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-9-126 
(1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.506 (purdon Supp. 1984). One report even 
advocates that the arbitration office devise its own rules of evidence. ARBITRATION 
OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 41. 
203. MSBA, supra note 156, at 141-42. 
204. Some states adopt this position. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-704 (1983); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-2O(D) (1978); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.506 
(Purdon Supp. 1984) (permits the admission of the award, but not the damages 
awarded). 
205. Although the issue has yet to be resolved, it is unlikely that a circuit court has the 
authority to remand a case to a health claims arbitration panel. See supra notes 113-
15 and accompanying text. If no authority exists to remand, the circuit court would 
have to vacate the panel's decision. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 3-
2A-06(c) (1984). 
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mention of the panel's decision in court, therefore, reduces health claims 
arbitration to nothing more than a costly advisory opinion. 
F. Voluntary Arbitration by Waiver 
Among the more hotly debated proposals to amend the Maryland 
statute is one to allow the parties the option of waiving arbitration and 
filing in court.206 Because the consent of both parties would be required 
to waive arbitration, each litigant would have the option of requiring that 
the case be submitted to arbitration.207 This would remove cases from 
the jurisdiction of the arbitration network that the parties agree would be 
better handled by the courtS.208 
This proposal would provide a vehicle for circumventing the pri-
mary purpose of the requirement for medical malpractice arbitration: to 
provide a framework for dispute resolution outside of the trial court. Ad-
ditionally, because of the low level of deference accorded health claims 
arbitration decisions and because of the large number of appeals, it is 
unlikely, if waiver were permitted, that either party would select arbitra-
tion for any reason other than its value as a dilatory tactic. Thus, arbitra-
tion would become a device for delaying justice, not expediting it. 
Lastly, with the demise of compulsory arbitration, the court dockets 
would again be clogged with malpractice cases. To make arbitration vol-
untary is to abolish it, and to abolish it is to return to the problems en-
countered at common law. 
G. Voluntary Arbitration by Contract 
A handful of states have relegated the decision to arbitrate to the 
doctor and his patient.209 These states accord legislative recognition to a 
pre-treatment contract executed by the physician and the patient. This 
contract calls for binding arbitration of all disputes arising out of the 
medical care received. These statutory schemes expand upon the com-
mon law principle that allows parties to bind themselves to arbitration.210 
Most of these modifications to the common law seek to ensure that the 
206. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 25-26; MSBA, supra note 156, at 140. The 
current bill is Senate Bill 156 (1985). 
207. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(A) (1982 & Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-26-104 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1984). 
208. Letter from John J. Sellinger to Chainnan V. Mike Miller, Jr. and Members of the 
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (April 6, 1984) (available in Maryland Leg-
islative Reference File SBl003IHBI527). 
209. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 600.5041 (West Supp. 1984); S.D. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-I-4 (1979); 
VA. CoDE § 8.01-581.12 (1984). 
210. See generally MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-201 through 3-234 (1984) 
(Maryland's version of the Unifonn Arbitration Act, which codifies the common 
law principles). 
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patient knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to have a jury resolve 
any disputes that might arise. 
The Michigan health claims statute,21l for example, requires that 
the patient be fully apprised of his rights, the most important of which is 
that signing. the agreement cannot be a prerequisite to receiving treat-
ment.212 Moreover, the patient is allowed to revoke the agreement, in 
writing, within sixty days of its execution.213 In emergency care situa-
tions, the agreement can be executed only after treatment has been 
rendered.214 
This contractual approach avoids many of the constitutional 
problems that plague mandatory arbitration.215 Because the parties exe-
cute the agreements between themselves, the courts have had little diffi-
culty in sustaining the agreements as knowing and voluntary waivers of 
the right to a jury triaJ.216 Furthermore, these agreements have been up-
held because they do not rise to the level of a complete waiver of future 
claims; rather, the patient is merely opting to have his dispute heard in a 
substitute forum.217 
Because there is no denial of the right to a jury trial, the panel deci-
sion can be accorded a greater degree offinality.218 After a contract arbi-
tration proceeding, the arbitrators' decision can only be appealed if it was 
rendered in violation of the rules of arbitration agreed to by the parties or 
if there is no support whatsover in the record for the arbitrators' findings 
of fact. 219 This is a major advantage over the duplicative procedure that 
exists when a de novo appeal is required. 
Although the contract arbitration schemes have managed to clear 
many of the constitutional hurdles, they have been repeatedly criticized 
as representing the product of unequal bargaining power.220 Thus far, 
these contract law challenges have been rejected when it was apparent 
that 1) the patients were fully apprised that they would be treated re-
gardless of whether they signed, and 2) there was a complete disclosure 
of the rights being waived.221 
211. MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042 (West Supp. 1984). 
212. [d. § 600.5042(2). 
213. [d. § 600.5041(3). 
214. [d. § 600.5042(1). 
215. Comment, supra note 28, at 685. 
216. See generally Mengel, The Constitutional and Contractual Challenges to Michigan's 
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act, 59 J. URB. LAW 319 (1982) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of the Act). 
217. [d. at 330. 
218. The Virginia health claims arbitration statute is an example of the different levels of 
deference that can be accorded. Virginia has adopted the non-binding arbitration 
for malpractice actions, unless there is an agreement to arbitrate. VA. CODE § 8.01-
581.2 (1984). When an agreement has been executed, the arbitration findings are 
binding on the parties. § 8.01-581.12(c). 
219. Prince George's County Educators' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 61 Md. App. 249,486 
A.2d 228 (1985) (findings of fact); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-224. 
220. Mengel, supra note 216, at 329-31. 
7.7.1. See. e.!?. Jackson v. Detroit Memorial Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202,312 N.W.2d 212 
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In spite of the judiciary's willingness to affirm on these grounds, it is 
difficult to understand how these two considerations can remove the like-
lihood that the arbitration agreement could easily become a contract of 
adhesion. By definition, doctors are the masters of the doctor-patient 
relationship. Thus, when asked to sign an arbitration agreement, most 
patients comply willingly, without consulting counsel. The result is that 
an important right has been waived without a complete understanding of 
that right or of the benefit of counsel. Without a doubt, such a waiver 
would never pass muster in a criminal case.222 Indeed, one has only to 
look to a recent survey conducted of patients in Michigan to see the pop-
ular misconceptions created by the public's failure to comprehend what 
it is surrendering.223 For example, the survey found that 62.2% misun-
derstood their rights and 74.2% mistakenly believed that they could ap-
peal the panel's ruling de novo.224 Moreover, the offering personnel -
the persons responsible for executing these contracts on behalf of patients 
- responded in large numbers that more than half of the patients they 
represented did not understand what was being waived.22s 
Another problem with contract arbitration is that it is not always 
fair to the physicians and hospitals. The rights created under the statutes 
almost always protect the patient.226 For example, many acts allow the 
patient to revoke the contract within a given time period without creat-
ing a similar right for health care providers.227 Also, there is a fear that 
malpractice insurers will compel physicians and hospitals to use these 
agreements and thereby force health care providers to surrender their 
important right to vindicate their reputations before a jury.228 
Although an act of the Maryland General Assembly would enhance 
the likelihood that a malpractice arbitration contract would be upheld by 
the courts, a common law framework already exists to support such a 
bargain.229 As the Michigan statistics reveal, however, public misconcep-
tions about the important rights being waived renders these agreements 
subject to attack under contract and public policy principles. Perhaps 
the doctor-patient relationship inherently precludes equal bargaining 
(1981), rev'd, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984); Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 
Mich. App. 100, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981), aff'd, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 
(1984); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981). 
222. See MD. R.P. 4-246; see also Epps v. State, 52 Md. App. 308, 450 A.2d 913 (1982) 
(waiver must be knowingly and intelligently entered). 
223. The study was conducted by a commission appointed by the Michigan State Legisla-
ture. The statistics were compiled by an accounting firm. The results are repro-
duced in Mengel, supra note 216, at 335-37. 
224. Id. at 336. 
225. Id. at 337. 
226. Seidel, Malpractice Reform in Michigan, 1976 DET. C.L. REv. 235, 249. 
227. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (1983) (30 days); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.5041(3) (West Supp. 1984) (60 days). 
228. Seidel, supra note 226, at 249. 
229. SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 7; McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 26, at 16. 
See generally 5A PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 17, ~4.11 (discussing how arbitra-
tion agreement can be upheld without statutory authority). 
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power. In addition, it is conceivable that the suspect nature of these 
agreements would produce many court cases as parties seek to litigate the 
legal issue of enforceability.230 Thus, much of the litigation that was sup-
posed to be avoided would return in the form of allegations of overreach-
ing. In this litigation, the elusive concept of unconscionability would be 
at issue rather than the already complicated issue of malpractice. 
H. Abandon Arbitration? 
Finally, several recent studies have recommended that health claims 
arbitration be abolished.231 These critics reason that the process is sim-
ply too time consuming and too troublesome to salvage. To them, it is 
better to live with the shortcomings of the common law than to endure 
the delay and duplication spawned by arbitration. In the words of the 
Liebmann Commission, a "[s]econd rate procedure is not acceptable."232 
What these critics have forgotten, however, is that the common law 
system was also unable to provide equitable claim resolution.233 Rather 
than the fifteen months consumed by arbitration, court cases dragged on 
for years.234 Moreover, according to recent estimates by the Maryland 
Administrative Office of the Courts, turning large numbers of malprac-
tice suits over to the courts would further add to the delay.23s 
More importantly, at common law, medical malpractice was tre-
mendously expensive. As trials and discovery dragged on year after year, 
the price tag rose to unprecedented heights. This rise in costs had two 
undesirable results. First, it became apparent that the patients were re-
covering only small portions of the verdicts in their favor, as litigation 
expenses and attorneys' fees consumed much of the awards.236 Second, 
higher costs were passed on to the patient in the form of an increase in 
the cost of health care.237 These cost increases were equally troubling; 
230. Mengel, supra note 216, at 331. 
231. See supra note 156. There are several bills pending before the Maryland General 
Assembly that would accomplish this end, including Senate Bills 152, 153, 154, and 
155. 
232. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 12. 
233. See supra notes 2-40 and accompanying text. 
234. Weston, supra note 133, at 6. 
235. Memorandum from Peter J. Lally to James H. Norris (Feb. 27, 1984) (fiscal impact 
upon the courts if the Arbitration Offici: is abolished); see also ARBITRATION OF-
FICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 45-47 (explaining the added burden abolition would 
place on the circuit courts if nearly 1000 malpractice cases were added to the 
dockets). 
236. The estimates on the amount of the award reaching the patient slip as low as seven-
teen percent. SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 2. 
237. According to the Prince George's Medical Society, the cost of inflated malpractice 
premiums added $35.00 per day to the cost of a hospital room. Statement of Leon 
R. Levitsky, M.D., Past President, Prince George's Medical Society Executive 
Committee, Prince George's County Medical Society (Feb. 25, 1976) (available in 
Maryland Legislative Reference File HB986). The Liebmann Report, however, 
contradicts these findings. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 2-9. 
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the system which provided only limited compensation for injured pa-
tients was being financed by the very patients it sought to protect. 
VII. A MODEST PROPOSAU38 
As the preceding analysis has revealed, there are a number of 
problems with the current health claims arbitration system. This is not 
to imply that the system is beyond salvation. Rather, a careful appraisal 
of the problems created by medical malpractice in general, coupled with 
a recognition of the limitations imposed on the finality of the arbitrators' 
decisions, lead to the conclusion that a streamlined health claims arbitra-
tion procedure is needed. 
First, well-trained and well-selected arbitrators are essential if 
panels are to reach correct decisions. A warm body in the arbitrator's 
seat serves no purpose unless it can make the meaningful contribution it 
was placed there to accomplish. Thus, only medical and legal specialists, 
competent to handle the particular problems presented by a particular 
kind of malpractice case, should be selected as arbitrators. Selection of 
arbitrators should, therefore, be made case by case, matching the person-
nel to the issues. Demanding, however, that these medical and legal spe-
cialists serve on panels without compensation is as unwise as it is 
unrealistic. Instead of involuntary service, the professionals on the panel 
must be offered an incentive to serve and given the confidence that theirs 
will be a meaningful contribution to the result of the case. The lay panel 
member, by contrast, is the perfect subject for a generalized compulsory 
selection process. Rather than expertise or knowledge, all he brings to 
the panel is a conscience and a willingness to search for the truth. Other 
motives are unacceptable. 
Second, if an arbitration system is to function efficiently, it must 
provide a swift ruling on the merits of a claim. There are a number of 
ways in which this might be accomplished. In Arizona, the legislature 
has set an eight-hour limit on the duration of an arbitration hearing.239 
Although this is a step in the right direction, it fails to account for the 
time consumed in pre-hearing preparation, which is where most of the 
time is consumed. The Liebmann Report advocates a two expert limita-
tion, unless the panel chairman finds good cause to permit additional 
experts.24O Once again, this proposal is a step in the right direction, but 
it does not go far enough. 0 
238. This heading, borrowed from J. SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING 
THE CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE FROM BEING A BURTHEN TO THEIR PARENTS 
OR THE COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLICK (W. 
Bickerton 2d ed. 1730), has been chosen because, although this proposal is neither 
satirical nor extreme as was Swift's, the authors believe it is a substantial departure 
from any of the previously discussed proposed solutions. 
239. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(D) (Supp. 1984-1985). 
240. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 11, at 30; see also ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, 
supra note 70, at 43 (quoting the Liebmann Report proposal approvingly). 
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What is needed is an abbreviated proceeding in which the panel, and 
not the parties, determines what evidence it will hear. Thus, under this 
inquisitorial system, only the depositions of the experts consulted by the 
parties would be submitted, unless the panel wanted to hear the live testi-
mony of any witness. 241 This would put the panel in control of what it 
needed to hear to decide the case, while reducing the length of most hear-
ings considerably. 
Given the abbreviated nature of this proceeding, it would be reason-
able to require that third party claims against nonhealth care providers 
be arbitrated. To exempt nonhealth care providers from arbitration 
would result in the filing of two lawsuits to resolve what is essentially one 
issue of fact. Not only is this unjustifiably wasteful, but the separate 
factfinders might reach different conclusions. This is especially likely be-
cause of the relaxed rules of evidence in the arbitration setting. 
Some report writers proposed to solve the third party problem by 
requiring that malpractice cases to which nonhealth care providers are 
joined be immediately transferred to the circuit court for trial of the en-
tire case.242 There are several problems with creating such an exemption 
from health claims arbitration. First, as the reports concede, there is the 
probability that anyone wishing to avoid arbitration would simply join a 
nonhealth care provider.243 Although the reports caution that such 
abuse could be reduced by requiring arbitration of all cases in which the 
nonhealth care provider was dismissed from the case in circuit court, 244 
they suggest no remedy for the delay resulting from shuttling the case 
from arbitration to circuit court and back again to arbitration. Second, 
because the health care provider on the arbitration panel is likely to be 
familiar with the medical products involved, there is no reason to exempt 
these cases from arbitration. In addition, exemption of nonhealth care 
providers from arbitration would defeat one of the central objectives of 
the arbitration system: keeping complicated malpractice cases out of the 
circuit court. Thus, it makes more sense to resolve all the disputes in one 
case before the arbitration panel. 
Once all the evidence was in the record, the panel would begin its 
deliberative process. One of three results would be produced by these 
deliberations: 1) a finding that the health care provider was negligent; 2) 
a finding of non-liability; or 3) a finding that it was impossible, without a 
complete trial, to decide the issue. If the panel found evidence of negli-
gence, it would set a damage award based upon the plaintiff's actual 
present and future economic losses and any pain and suffering. Some 
241. The Maryland State Bar Association initially recommended a similar arbitration 
system. See SPECIAL CoMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 3-4. The reason for the abbre-
viated hearing was "to insure that the hearing would not be transformed into a 
replica of a full scale trial." [d. 
242. ARBITRATION OFFICE STUDY, supra note 70, at 42-43; MSBA, supra note 156, at 
137-38. 
243. See supra note 242. 
244. See supra note 241. 
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states have prohibited awards for pain and suffering under the guise of 
reducing awards.24s Leaving aside the potential constitutional infirmities 
of these statutes,246 there is no valid reason for singling out malpractice 
cases. Thus, pain and suffering should remain an element of damages. 
Lastly, any award would include the costs of arbitration. 
At this juncture, the panel would present its findings to the parties. 
They would be free to accept the findings or to pursue an action to nullify 
in the circuit court. If an action to nullify is filed by the party who pre-
vailed before the panel, the panel award would be vacated.247 Hence, no 
mention of it could be made in court. This would prevent plaintiffs from 
using the panel award as a floor from which to argue for additional dam-
ages. Those plaintiffs who prevail before the panel and fail to secure an 
equal or greater award in circuit court would have to pay the other 
party's expenses. These expenses would include the opponent's attor-
ney's fees. 248 This sanction would surely dampen the filing of knee-jerk 
appeals. If nothing else, it would place the costs of filing such appeals on 
the one who ought to pay them. 
For those physicians who lose before the panel, an action to nullify 
could be taken without penalty. But if the panel decision is affirmed or 
not reduced, interest on the award would run from the date the panel's 
decision was returned and the appellant would be assessed costs and ex-
penses. As above, the expenses should include the appellee's attorney's 
fees. 
The deference accorded the panel's decision would remain the same 
as under the present system.249 According to Attorney General v. John-
son,2S0 this is an inescapable constitutional requirement.2S1 The trial in 
the circuit court would remain unchanged. At the request of the party 
who prevailed before the panel, however, the health care provider from 
the panel could be called as an expert to explain to the jury why the panel 
found as it did. Of course, the party calling the health care provider 
panel member as an expert would have to bear the expense of compensat-
ing the expert. This would guarantee that the basis for the panel decision 
was adequately explained, while providing the appellee with an available 
expert who is already familiar with the case. 
This system of arbitration represents a realistic appraisal of the limi-
tations imposed by de novo review. Under its operation, discovery would 
be shortened as would be the arbitration hearing process. As a result, all 
245. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1983); VA. STAT. § 8.01-581.15 
(1984). See generally J. KALISCH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ~ 20.07 n.59 (Supp. 
1983) (citing to D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 15). 
246. See generally Taylor & Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence 
Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799 (1982). 
247. For a comparable proposal, see SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5. 
248. Id. at 5-6. 
249. See supra notes 108-27 and accompanying text. 
250. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). 
251. Id. 
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parties concerned would have swifter access to justice and the cost of 
litigation would be reduced substantially. The presumption of correct-
ness, when coupled with monetary sanctions for meritless appeals, would 
produce some incentive to settle. If nothing else, monetary sanctions 
would impose the costs of delay upon the person who caused it: the ap-
pealing party. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
With malpractice suits and awards on the rise, the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly is again confronted with a malpractice crisis, one having 
new dimensions. What distinguishes this crisis from its predecessor is 
that one of the major contributing factors to the current crisis is the arbi-
tration system created by the General Assembly in an effort to solve the 
former crisis. Another difference is that the legislature is now aware of 
the effect of the constitutional and practical limitations on the ability of 
arbitration to solve the problem. It is hoped that, benefitted by this in-
sight, the General Assembly will set its sights on engineering a health 
claims arbitration system that is designed to cope with the problems out-
lined above. Only by the General Assembly's focusing upon these special 
considerations can any meaningful resolution of the crisis come about. 
